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PREFACE
This thesis is the product of several personal experiences
which include years of study in the Federal Republic of
Germany, in the United States and research at the United Na-
tions in New York. All these experiences shaped in different
ways my own awareness of the complexity as well as the
limits of the study of political science, international re-
lations and their environment.
I have debts of gratitude to the many people, perhaps
too many to mention, who in various ways helped me to pursue
my studies in the United States and to accomplish this work.
My thesis committee (Professors Gerard Braunthal
,
Eric S.
Einhorn and M. J. Peterson of the Department of Political
Science, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst) provi-
ded me with useful advice and invaluable support during the
long process of transforming my first ideas on this subject
into the final draft. To all the persons whom I interviewed
in New York and Bonn, I would like to express my thanks for
their co-operation. My research on the European political
co-operation at the United Nations General Assembly in the
1980’s would not have been possible without the support of
the library staff of the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst, the Lamont Library of Harvard University, and the
Dag Hammarskjdld Library at the United Nations. My special
thanks go to Dr. Jurgen Dedring for his advice and support
during my research at the United Nations headquarters in New
York
.
My graduate studies at Amherst would not have been pos-
sible without the granting of an exchange scholarship by
both the University of Heidelberg and the University of
Massachusetts for the academic year of 1985 - 1986
. I am
grateful for the support I received during my second year at
the Graduate School at Amherst through the awarding of a
foreign student scholarship by the University of Massach-
usetts and the Quadrille Ball Fellowship by the Germanistic
Society of America. I give special thanks to the staff of
the foreign student offices, both in Heidelberg and Amherst.
The responsibility for any thesis' defects rests quite
rightly with me alone.
Klaus -Di e ter Stadler
NOTE ON CITATIONS
General Assembly records are cited by session, body and
meeting. Untile the thirtieth regular session plenary and
main committee meetings were numbered consecutively without
regard to session. The resolutions of the General Assembly
were indentified by an arabic numeral followed by a roman
numeral in parantheses indicating the session (for example:
resolution 3363 (XXX)). Since the thirty-first session, Ge-
neral Assembly documents, resolutions, decisions and mee-
tings have been numbered consecutively within sessions, each
session starting anew. Resolutions have been identified by
an arabic numeral, indicating the session, followed by an
oblique stroke and another arabic numeral (for example: re-
solution 31/1, decision 31/301). The first plenary meeting
in the 40th session is cited as A/40/PV.1. Main committee
meetings add a notation for the commmittee (C.l through C.6
and SPC for the Special Political Committee).
x
introduction
NATURE OF PROBLEMS AND METHODS OF STUDY
The European Political Co-operation (EPC) has been an ele-
ment of Western European integration for more than a decade.
It demonstrates the united will of the twelve governments in
the European Community (EC) to promote common actions in the
field of foreign policy. After co-operation in economic
fields had not brought the expected success in political-
integration terms, the co-operation in the field of foreign
policy should achieve more Western European influence in in-
ternational relations and enable Europe 1 to "speak with one
voice" in world politics. The EPC added a second form of Eu-
ropean co-operation to the already existing economic integ-
ration process of the European Communities in order to secu-
re an appropiate role for Europe in the future. For the pu-
blic as well as for non-European political groups, the
^
f'
erence s between these two forms of European integration
are often irritating and not understandable.
This study deals exclusively with the newer form of Eu-
ropean integration: namely the European Polical Co-operation
(EPC)
. It analyses the co-operation on political issues bet-
ween the twelve EC member states in the framework of the EPC
at the United Nations General Assembly in the 1980’s.
1
The United Nations (U.N.), and especially the General
Assembly, Is a natural showcase for observing the co-
operation of the European states on all important issues in
world politics. The General Assembly (G.A.) can be rightly
called the principal body of the United Nations. Because of
the universality of its membership, the wide scope of its
agenda, its supervisory role in relation to other U.N.
organs, its budget-making powers, and the continuing desire,
in spite of criticism, of leaders of all countries to attend
its sessions, it comes closest to a kind of a world
parliament. G.A. decisions determine the policies of the
U.N. bodies; focus world attention on some problems and away
from others; define for many societies what constitutes a
problem; and help shape the context in which the West 2 must
operate with regard to important matters. Consequently votes
in the U.N. are often regarded, rightly or wrong, as expres-
sions of world opinion on major issues.
The U.N. provides an example of the structural political
tensions between regionalism and universal i sm
. The desire
for regional structures in form of groups, as in the case of
the European Community or other blocs, has increased since
the foundation of the U.N. and blocs are now one of the do-
minating factors in the world organization. The U.N. also
offers the universal stage for the exhibition of political,
economic, and social conflicts mainly between industrialized
2
nations and developing countries. Moreover offers the uni-
versal U.N. the "turbulent field", in the words of Ernst
Haas, in which regional integration occurs. The co-operation
of the Twelve 3 is a i so interesting for political scientists
to observe because it characterizes one way of formulating
foreign policy in modern world politics: an effort to make
joint policy through multilateral co-operation. Furthermore,
the EPC is interesting for studies on integration and inter-
national organizations. It functions on an intergovernmental
basis, coping with a difficult situation of the economic and
social integration of the EC, whose stagnation confounds the
prediction of automatic "spill over" of the integration pro-
cess predicted by some of the integration theorists. 4
This study deals only with one area of the EPC, namely
its members’ co-operation at the G . A . in the 1980’s. Beside
the above mentioned theoretical questions others were
especially decisive for the choice of this subject, for
which no other study for the 1980’s exists: The United Nati-
ons is a challenge and a problem for the continuing co-
operation between the European states and other Western
states. They are a small - but economically strong - minori-
ty at the G . A . where they are confronted with a majority of
Th i rd World countries and their demands for economic and po-
litical equality. The European desire for a long-term common
foreign policy is confronted continously by Third World
3
demands
.
ormer are being pressed t o prove how
Thereby the f
serious they take their co-operation
The Southern enlargement of the EC by three Mediterra-
nean states during the 1980’s, namely Greece, Spain and
Portugal, has naturally affected the policy of the EPC at
the U . N
. ,
what has to be analyzed.
In this context the study shall examine where the possi-
bilities and limitations of the EPC in New York lie. It has
to be examined if and to what degree the EPC is able to work
efficiently in the regional European and in the broader
Western context.
The position of the United States and its policy in the
G.A. during the 1980’s is not without influence on the role
of the EPC at the U.N., and therefore also has to be
discussed briefly.
The differences of competence between the EC, and the
EPC, and how it has affected the co-operation of the Twelve
has to be analyzed in this context as well.
Research for this study had to surmount several
problems, which stemmed mainly from the special character of
the EPC as an intergovernmental unit based on direct consul-
tations between the foreign ministers and the foreign mini-
stries of the Twelve. The EPC does not possess a huge bu-
reacrautic apparatus such as the EC maintains, but it is or-
ganized through a presidential system - with a six-month
4
rotating presidency - leaving the main burden to the
individual national ministries. The decisive actors in the
EPC decision making process co-operate together; therefore
no publicly accessible EPC documents, minutes of meetings,
papers or other materials exist which could reveal the con-
tent and the procedures of EPC co-operation. Only common
declarations, press releases and certain reports on EPC pro-
cess are being publicized.
Similanly public documentation on the co-operation of
the Twelve at the U.N. is scanty. Only statements by the
presidency on behalf of the Twelve in the G
. A
.
plenary or
its committees are available. The voting behavior of the Eu-
ropeans at the G.A. on individual resolutions can be obser-
ved from the official U.N. documents on questions where a
roll-call vote is taken. By making statistical tables of
the votes cast one can analyze the voting patterns of the
Twelve during the 1980’s, and thereby the development of EPC
could systematically be observed and tendencies analyzed.
Even when there is no roll-call vote, the national
explanations of votes" publicized in the "verbatim records"
of G.A. meetings give conclusions about differences in the
national positions of the Twelve.
These problems, and the nonavailability of documents of
the 40th session of the G.A. in the Five College area, made
it necessary for the author to conduct most of his research
5
at the United Nations Headquarter in New York and at the La-
ment library of Harvard University in Cambridge. On the ba-
sis of interviews with diplomats of most of the twelve EC
delegations, the mission of the EC Commission and the U.S.
mission at the U.N. in New York (conducted during September
and October 1986), as well as of documentary materials in
New York and Cambridge, the necessary factual information
for the study could be obtained. The major interviews were
supplemented by shorter contacts with members of other West-
ern and Third World delegations as well as with officials of
the U.N. Secretariat. Finally, interviews were conducted at
the Federal Foreign ministry in Bonn with national officials
directly involved in the EPC proceedings and in U.N.
questions, during July 1986, which complemented the research
for this study.
The interviews were conducted in a non-standardized
form, the questions were adopted on an ad hoc basis to the
specific circumstances of the factual suppositions of the
respondents and actual discussions at the G.A. The confi-
dential nature of the interviews does not make it presently
possible to specify the names of the officials questioned.
Despite the lack of enough relevant data, the author is
convinced that through the available materials, press
reports, journal articles, the analysis of
behavior of the European states, and interviews
the voting
in New York
6
and Bonn, a scholarly analysis of the EPC at the United Na-
tions could be made satisfactorily. Nevertheless many que-
stions can only defintely be anserwed if all archives are
opened for research.
The study is divided into three major parts. The first
part, the West in the United Nations, describes the position
of the Western states in the U.N., which is characterized by
its minority role towards the majority of Third World coun-
tries and the role of the EPC in them. This part will also
emphasize the position of the United States in the United
Nations General Assembly and its impact on the twelve Euro-
pean states. The second part, the EPC Process, describes
first the origins, development and goals of the EPC organi-
sation of which the co-operation in New York is a part. Then
the EPC consulations and instruments at the G.A., the way
the EPC acts, and how its co-operation with the EC Commissi-
on is working in the U.N. is analyzed. Part three, Possibi-
lities and Limits of EPC, analyzes the overall voting pat-
tern of the EPC Member States, which are characterized by
the steady competition between national and European
interests. The study also includes the enlargement of the
EPC in the 1980’s, how the permanent membership of France
and the United Kingdom influence the EPC process, and how
the twelve EC Member States acted and voted on some of the
main political issues in the 40th G.A., including
7
Afghanistan
,
Middle East
.
suits of the
Cambodia, South Africa, Central America and the
The thesis concludes with a summary and the re-
study
.
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NOTES TO INTRODUCTION
1.
This study understands by the term "Europe" exclusively
Western Europe. It consists of several sovereign states
connected through economic and political co-operation -
which have entrusted the common structure of the European
Community with certain national powers and rights and who
share different feelings of togetherness.
2.
By the term "West" the author means the unity of all
Western European states, Canada, the United States, New Zea-
land and Australia which share common political and economic
values and which are members or observers of the "Western
European and Others Group". As a geographical group it is
referred to in certain General Assembly resolutions as being
entitled to a specific number of seats or membership (e.g.
,
vice-presidencies of the G.A., number of seats on the Econo-
mic and Social Council).
3. The description "the Twelve" is used throughout the stu-
dy for the original six, then nine, later ten and now twelve
Member States of the European Community.
4. Integration theory and regionalism theory have made a
fundamental development since their emergence. This is
especially the case for the neofunctionalism in the integra-
tion theory. The writings of many neofunctionalists focus
on the formation and evolution of the European community.
Especially Ernst Haas has drawn much of his assumptions ab-
out integration from his anlysis of the European Community.
The central part of Haas’s work is the concept of "spill-
over". In his view economic issues in a democratic,
pluralistic, industrial setting are most likely to spill
over into politicial integration. Because it would extent
the content of this thesis by including a discussion on the
interdependence between the EPC and different aspects of in-
tegration theory - without the intention of completeness -
some bibliographical notices: Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Eu-
rope (Stanford, 1958). By examining the process of European
integration in the 1960’s and 1970’s Haas modified his
spill-over concept over time. See here especially his
articles: "International Integration: The European and the
Unversal Process", International Organisation , XV (Autumn
1961); "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin
America", Journal of Common Market Studies, V (June 1967),
and "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional
Integration” , In ternati onal Organization, 30 (1976). Joseph
9
Nye hypothesezed in his seven process mechanism for
neofunctionalist theory, for example that imbalances orinherent linkages of tasks in the integration proces can be
a force for pressing political actors to redefine their com-
mon tasks
.
^Thereby a linkage can caused either in form of a
spill-over or a "spill-back". See, for example, Joseph S.
Nye
,
Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional
Organisation, 30 (1976). See also Karl Deutsch, France, Ger-
many and the Western Alliance (New York, 1967); Richard
Inglehart, "An End to European Integration", American Poli-
tical Review, LXI (March 1967). L.N. Lindberg, The Political
Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford 1963);
C.J. Friedrich, Europe: An Emergent Nation? (New York, 1969)
or Stanley Hoffmann, Gullivers Troubles or Setting of Ameri-
can Foreign Policy (New York, 1968) and "The Fate of the Na-
tion State', Daedalus, VC (Summer 1966). Critic on the in-
tegrationist approach to Western Europe is, for example,
mentioned by Charles Pentland, International Theory and Eu-
ropean Integration, (London, 1973); Leon Lindberg and Stuart
A. Scheingold ( eds )
,
Regional Integration Theory and Rese-
arch (Cambridge, 1971); and Amitai Etzioni, Political Unifi-
cation (New York, 1964).
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CHAPTER I
THE WEST IN THE UNITED NATIONS
Jeane Kirkpatrick, the Reagan Administration’s first ambas-
sador to the U.N., emphasized that the importance of
decisions of the United Nations are widely interpreted as
reflecting "world opinion", and are being endowed "with sub-
stantial moral and intellectual force". Even if not
dangerous, UN votes affect both the image and the reality
of power in the U.N. system and beyond it", stated
Kirkpatrick
.
1
Resolutions are either adopted in the form of consensus,
which indicates that no vote was taken and a decision was
achieved through a process of consensus, or in form of roll-
call or recorded votes on controversial issues. For example,
the 40th General Assembly adopted a record number (353) of
resolutions and decisions, more than half of which (198) we-
re decided without a vote or by consensus. Some 201 issues
were decided by vote; in a number of cases votes were held
on separate paragraphs as well as on the entire resolutions.
In the 1980’s the structural conditions for the Western
States in the United Nations and especially in the General
Assembly are based mainly on the large majority of Third
World countries; and the way decisions and resolutions are
1
1
being adopted in the U.N. organs
.
In the first years of its existence the United Nations
was dominated by the Western States under the leadership of
the United States. However, through the process of de-
colonization, specially in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s,
this major feature of the United Nations was totally
changed. Of the 159 member-states at the 40th General Assem-
bly in 1986 were 124 of the Third World. Therefore the image
of the U.N. at present is dominated by this large majority
of Third World countries in the General Assembly, the
specialized U.N. agencies and the functional conferences
sponsored by these countries.
A. MINORITY POSITION IN THE U.N.
In the United Nations one must distinguish between electoral
groups, based on geography, and caucusing groups based on
political, economic and other affinities. Most Third World
countries are members of the "Non-Aligned Movement", a poli-
tical caucusing group, which consisted in the 40th G.A. of
ninety-nine members. Within this numerically dominant nona-
ligned movement African nations represent the largest regio-
12
nal g rouP- "They can bring their influence to bear directly
through the weight of the bloc's 50 member states”, accor-
ding to Monique Rubens, a U.N. observer .
2
Most of the Asian
nations as well as some Latin American nations make up the
rest of the Non-Alignment Movement. A united non-aligned
bloc holds an automatic majority in the United Nations. As
Jeane Kirkpatrik noted, "support from the Non-Aligned-
Movement guarantees the success of any resolution in the Ge-
neral Assembly’. 3 The absolute decision-making majority of
the Third World is the all influential factor at the United
Nations. Therefore the view of the G . A . differs between
western observers, who view the G . A . as "a place where un-
friendly majorities use their numbers to pursue conflict and
where dictatorships of various stripes can impose double
standards at the West’s expense"; and Third World statesmen,
who view "the Assembly with greater confidence; they see it
as a place where the weak and the developing can protect
their interests, restrain the strong and promote a more
equitable world order", according to M.J. Peterson, an ex-
pert on the General Assembly. 4 In the Western states,
especially the U.S.
,
concern over the drift of the world bo-
dy has been particulary strong. In the United States the
U.N. was highly critized among conservatives, some even
challenging the validity of continued United States
participation. The Heritage Foundation, the Washington based
13
think-tank" of the neo-conservative movement, contends that
the U.N. "had turned into a largely Anti-American club domi-
nated by the Soviet bloc, by European leftists, and by ra-
dical countries in the third world. "» The policy of Jeane
Kirkpatrick as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations was
based on this neo-conservative philosophy in foreign policy
issues. She spoke and acted, according to Seymour M. Finger,
a former U.S. diplomat at the U.N., out of "ideological
conviction, as the representative of an Administration that
is, by American standards, unusually ideological". 6 The Uni-
ted States delegation returned under her leadership at the
United Nations, to the style of confrontation with the non-
aligned majority practised under Ambassador Moynihan in the
mid-seventies. Kirkpatrick did not hesitate "to stand alone
on issues and has done so with great regularity. No one can
doubt the consistency, coherence and firmness of U.S.
behavior at the United Nations", according to Finger. 7
The European states were more reluctant to oppose the
non-aligned states directly. 8 Instead of seeking controversy
with Third World countries, the European Community tried to
play a role in which it could "actively promote the recon-
cialiation of political and economic interests between North
and South", according to Renate Finke-Os iander
,
director for
United Nations Affairs at the German Federal Foreign office
in 1985. 9 Therefore the Europeans preferred close co-
14
operation and consultation with the Non-Alignment Movement
in order to achieve more acceptable and practical results.
These differences in the perception of participation
between the Western States are real. However, all Western
Leaders agree that the West is generally heavily outvoted in
the General Assembly on most issues. The Western States hold
a mainly defensive position at the U.N. and are usually try-
ing to limit damages rather than advance their own policy
goals toward the Third World majority.
B. PRESENT WESTERN CONSULTATION MECHANISMS
A bloc or a group at the United Nations consists of
individual states pursuing common objectives. As already
mentioned, groups can be divided into regional, political,
and groups resulting from intergovernmental economic trea-
ties or groups based on a common level of economic de-
velopment or other common interests . 10 Blocs and groups are
the influential decision-making factors at the U.N. Besides
the Non-Aligned Movement, groups such as the African Group,
the Islamic Conference (forty-two nations) or the Arab Group
(twenty-one nations) decisively influence the majority of
15
Third World countries.
In the Western context, the Western European and Others
Group ( WEOG ) has, as other formal geographic groups, two
main reasons for existence: the exchange of informations,
and agreement on candidates for elections in cases where
geographical criteria are relevant. The WEOG consists of all
the Western European states, Canada, New Zealand and
Australia. The United States, the Holy See and Switzerland
are observers. The formal WEOG strictly limits itself to
electoral and related questions. Examples of political
groups in the Western bloc are: the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO), which only is active if treaty matters
are involved in U.N. resolutions; the European Communities;
and the Nordic Group, consisting of Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway and Sweden.
Groups based on formal international economic agreements
are the Member States of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA)
; the Organization for Economic co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD); and the European Economic Community (EEC).
In these groups the member states try to co-ordinate their
interests in economic matters whenever it is necessary or
obligatory by the specific treaty of each organization.
More informal political groups exist for spec i a 1
purposes. The Vinci-Group, named after Ambassador Piero
Vinci, the Italian permanent representative at the time of
16
its inception, consists of the WEOG countries and Japan. He-
re in a consultative forum, political questions and economic
issues of the 2nd Committee of the G . A
. are discussed. The
so-called "Barton Group” discusses disarmament and arms con-
trol questions in preparation for the General Assembly
session. Named after Ambassador William Barton, Canadian
permanent representative (first in Geneva, later in New
York), the Barton Group consists of the EC-states;
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey and
the United States. Participation differs, however, from is-
sue to issue; in all these groups only a loose co-operation
on an informal basis takes place. The prime motive for the
foundation of these groups is mutual information instead of
formal consultations, with the aim of common positions and
declarations
.
The interests of the participating member states in the-
se informal political groups are, however, too divergent to
reach common positions. Moreover there exists only a minimal
interest on the side of the Twelve on consultations within
the Vinci Group, because co-ordination of their policies in
the EPC context clearly has priority. Also, the EC is so
preoccupied by its consultations that little time is left
for broad co-operation in the Western context. The small
Nordic Group also is an example of more effective co-
ordination practised by a smaller number of states than in
17
the larger WEOG
. Therefore, the WEOG is probably the weakest
of all existing groups because "its membership includes two
cohesive clusters that take many distinctive positions, the
five Scandinavian states and the European Community", accor-
ding to Peterson
.
11
The United States has frequent informal meetings with
the WEOG group or the other subgroups. Because of the less
stringent co-operation in these informal groups they lack
importance for the U.S. The U.S. is not a member in any
group, and thus is weakened by being the only member (along
with Israel) unable to provide bloc votes as a broker in the
decision-making process inside the U.N. On the other hand
the U.S. is free to pursue its own aims at the General
Assembly
.
1 2
C. U.S. AND EC AS RIVALS FOR LEADERSHIP OF THE WEST
The co-operation between the European states and its
influence at the G.A. depends in part on the role of the
United States at the U.N. The position of the United States
at the General Assembly has therefore shortly to be
analyzed
.
18
Over the last twenty years nearly every crisis in the
Third world has produced major trans-Atlantic strains bet-
ween the U.S. and its European allies: the Vietnam war, the
1973 Middle East conflict, the Iranian hostage crisis, the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Grenada crisis in 1983,
and the American attack on Lybia in 1986, are a few
examples
.
The General Assembly is a natural political arena for
the discussion of international conflicts and crises, and
the emergence of a partial division in the Western Alliance
on certain issues is therefore reflected at Turtle Bay. The
evolving characteristic of the United Nations, its division
into blocs, even into an overlapping series of blocs has af-
fected the United States, which is not a member of any of
the political blocs, and its European allies, in different
ways. For the Europeans the "nature of the institution and
the range of its agenda make the United Nations a principal
diplomatic showcase of European efforts to adopt a common
stand on international issues", according to Michael Hardy,
head of the delegation of the EC-Commiss ion to the United
Nations. 13 The Twelve are generally accepted at the United
Nations as a bloc and EC participation is an established
element of the U.N. system today.
The U.S., on the other hand, is uncomfortable with the
U.N. bloc system, which it highly criticizes. President
19
Reagan declared for example at the General Assembly in 1983,
that the "founders of the United Nations expected that mem-
ber nations would behave and vote as individuals". The emer-
gance "of blocs and the polarization of the United Nations
undermine all that this organization is initially valued",
stated the U.S. president. 14 By comparing the EC and the
U.S. position at the U.N. Jeane Kirkpatrick stated that the
EC operates with a notable sophistication and discipline
and is usually able to reach a common position and maintain
it". On the other hand, she described the U.S. role in the
multiparty political system of the General Assembly as
that of a "splinter party" which is sometimes able to work
out single-issue alliances with other countries or blocs,
most often with the EC, the ASEAN states or Lat in-American
countries. Kirpatrik stated, that basically the U.S. is
alone, because "it is without reliable allies, because it
belongs to no group. The United States, she contendes,
"lacks the influence on processes and decisions groups can
exercise". 15 In the mid-1980’s, The United States was ge-
nerally isolated as the "ideological villain" in the General
Assembly, observed Richard Bernstein of the New York Times
observed. 16 The U.S. has had to face similar difficulties
in the Western bloc. The author Thomas Frank stated that "we
frequently find ourselves almost completely isolated, wit-
hout apparent allies". 17 The departure of the U.S. from UN-
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ESCO at the end of 1984, and the decision of the U.S. Cong-
ress to reduce American financial contributions, were signs
of the controversial and aggressive U.S. policy in the Uni-
ted Nations under Ambassador Kirkpatrick.
The replacement of Kirkpatrick by Vernon A. Walters in
1985 was regarded by foreign diplomats, however, as a change
in style and policy of the U.S. That led to a less contro-
versial and more positive attitude of the U.S. towards the
United Nations. The Reagan Admins trat ion has started to re-
verse the negative trend and has focused on the United Nati-
ons as a key forum for American foreign interests, which
could be severaly damaged by Congressional budget cuts. 18
While the United States pursued a controversial, often
agressive policy at the U.N. based on its national interests
and reluctance to achieve compromises, the Europeans were
far more likely to weigh domestic and regional consi-
derations before voting with the Americans. The Europeans
seemed to be more concerned and involved in Third World is-
sues at the U.N. than their American counterparts, in part
because of the dependence of Europeans on the developing
countries for economic markets, colonial traditions and
their geographic locations.
While the U.S. remained partially in self-chosen
isolation, the other non-aligned Western states looked in
the direction of the EC. The voting of the EC attracted the
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attention of states with special relations to the EC states
as well as other states because of the consensus building
process taking place inside the EC. The membership of
Denmark in the Nordic Group, the association of the United
Kingdom with Commonwealth states or the economic links of
Third World countries to the EC (e.g. by the Lome-Treaties
)
are examples of the entanglement of the Twelve with non-
aligned countries. But, it is also general knowledge that
common EC positions are developed in an often long-lasting
consensus building process where different positions merge
into an acceptable compromise. Therefore, according to
Kaufmann, "other delegations apparently reason that, if the
EC countries have come to a common voting pattern, that po-
sition must be based on an ’average’ and perhaps consensus
at t idude "
.
1
9
European co-operation confronts the United States also
with an increasingly common European view, thus producing
the possibility of American isolation within the Western
bloc, which further complicates the U.S. position at the
U.N.
In the United Nations the "key to policy leadership . .
.
is a country’s relationship with the developing countries,
which constitute a majority of UN members... the Europeans
now enjoy better relations with those countries than the
United States", according to Charles William Maynes
,
Assi-
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stant Secretary of State for International Organization Af-
fairs during the Carter Administration . 2
0
While the lea-
dership position in the Western alliance outside the U.N. is
cleany held by the United States, the situation inside the
U.N. is different. The European states were during most of
the 1980’s in a better position than the United States at
the General Assembly and could often play a leadership role
in the Western Group, as well as at the U.N. as a whole.
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CHAPTER II
THE EPC PROCESS
British Foreign Minister
,
Sir Geof f re y Howe, declared at the
opening of the 41st United Nations General Assembly on
behal
f
of the European Community and its twelve Member
States
,
that
:
we Europeans have feared and distrusted,
fought and plundered one another. Yet,
today, twelve free countries of Western
Europe can speak to the world, with a
single voice... Let there be no doubt: a
challenge to one of us is a challenge to
all - whether it be to our liberties,
interests, rights or well-being; whether
it comes from terrorists or drug-dealers,
from bullies or tyrants.” 1
His statement has based on the sixteen year old political
co-operation among the EC Member States in the field of for-
eign policy. The United Nations, and more specifically the
General Assembly, has become one of the major arenas where
European Political Co-operation is executed. The EPC became
active at the U.N. after the accesion of the Federal Repu-
bl ic of Germany to membership in 1973 2 meant that for the
first time all EC Member States were represented in the Ge-
neral Assembly
.
Th e G.A. is the natural forum for the Euro-
peans to co-ordinate their policies on the many issues in
world politics, reflected in the agenda of the G.A. Before
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analyzing the EPC in New York, an understanding of the broa-
der EPC process in which the co-operation in New York is
incoperated is necessary.
A. ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND GOALS OF EPC
Initial efforts to start political co-operation in foreign
policy issues were less succesful than those that spurred
economic co-operation between the European states through
establishing the European Communities. It took various ef-
forts to enlarge the co-operation from the narrow economic
basis, laid down in the 1957 treaty of Rome, to a broader
political basis. With the increasing necessity to deal with
classical issues of foreign policy, an enlargement of the EC
instruments for co-operation in foreign policy became
necessary. The plans for a European Defense Community and a
European Political Community, or the aim of Charles de Gaul-
le to establish a political secretariat in Paris, proved to
be abortive efforts in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Only through
the adoption of the Luxemburg Report in 1970 did the Member
States reach agreements establishing the European Political
Co-operation (EPC). The purpose of the EPC was to create an
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intergovernmental structure, rather than a’ i bii i cn new common
organization, in which the Foreign Ministers and their mini-
stries could work together. The EPC is, by its nature, a dy-
namic framework of co-operation among the Member States of
the EC
,
it is therefore in constant evolution. The signing
of the "Single European Act" in February 1986 is the newest
change in the feature of the EPC. 3
Foundation and Development
Since its establishment in 1970, the EPC has been reviewed,
and its processes revised several times. The Luxemburg
Report, also known as the Davignon Report, estabished the
EPC. The Foreign Ministers of the then six Member States ag-
reed to co-operate in their foreign policies by regular con-
sultations on all issues of world politics with relevance
for European interests. Harmonization and common actions
should be achieved, and stabilize thereby the solidarity
among the member states. Following the EC enlargement with
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom the, then nine,
members adopted in 1973 the Copenhagen Report. They affirmed
and specified the EPC process, agreed upon in 1970, and pro-
posed a more intensive co-operation. In 1981, after the ac-
cession of Greece, the ten members approved the London
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Report, which reviewed the development of the EPC and adop-
ted changes in its procedures whereby its' machinery should
be strengthened and enhanced. 4
The "Solemn Declaration for a European Union" adopted by
the Heads of the Member States in Stuttgart on June 19, 1983
did not change the EPC concept but repeated the claim of the
London Report that consultations in political security mat-
ters should, moreover, be included. It also contained a com-
mitment by the Member States to contribute to the
establishment of a European Union. 5
In negotiations during different European Council mee-
tings and subsequent Foreign Ministers’ meetings following
the Stuttgart Declaration, agreements on a further de-
velopment of the European Community were reached. They were
expressed in the "Single European Act", which was agreed
upon in December 1985 and signed in February 1986. 6 The
Single European Act consists of two major parts of modest,
but partly significant measures designed to strengthen the
EC: the first revised the treaties establishing the European
Communities; while the second created a legal framework for
the EPC. This second part confirmed and supplemented the
procedures agreed upon in the previously mentioned reports
and in "the Solemn Declaration on European Union" as well as
the practices gradually established among the Member States.
The most important change by that act contains the decision
29
to establish an EPC Secretariat
independently from the EC Commission
support the Presidency of the EPC. i
in Brussels
,
apparatus, which
acting
should
—
EPC Part of the Europea n Integration PrnoPge
The Single European Act is the first treaty covering both
the development of the Community through the Treaty of Rome
and Political Co-operation in connecting them for the first
time. Its adoption has made it possible to encompass econo-
mic and political matters and to avoid the risk of disrup-
ting the unity of the institutional system of the European
Community
.
The ’’Single European Act" states that the "European Com-
munities and European Political Co-operation shall have as
their objective to contribute to making concrete progress
towards European unity" and should achieve the goal of a
European Union 8 that is cohesive and strong enough to
withstand any difficulties.
The EPC is a collaboration among sovereign States which
had - until the 1986 decision to establish a secretariat
no special institutions and was and will further be conduc-
ted by intergovernmental procedures. Its decisions are not
legally binding. The co-operative procedure is conducted in
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form of exchanges of information and consultations, and if
considered necessary, in joint action in matters of foreign
policy. The EPC consists in the political commitment of the
governments of the Member States to consult each other on
all major issues where European interests are involved to
reach common positions in specific cases. If agreement on a
common posture cannot be reached, each Member State is free
to pursue its own line of policy. No one has therefore re-
linquished national freedom of action in foreign affairs.
Yet in many international matters the EC states have reached
common positions, pursued common actions and cast common vo-
ting in international organizations
.
9
Although, the EC and the EPC are two different forms of
co-operation, there is in practice often a need for close
co-ordination because deliberations and decisions of the one
frequently affect the deliberations of the other.
B. U.N. MATTERS IN THE WIDER EPC ORGANIZATION
United Nations matters are involved in nearly all the pro-
cesses of the European Political Co-operation. Together with
issues arising at Conferences on Security and co-operation
in Europe ( CSCE ) , issues handled in the United Nations
establish the major fields of a nearly continuous EPC
process. Besides the original goal of European integration,
the co-operation at the U.N. has also added a further goal
to the EPC policy: the spanning of the North and South con-
flict in order to revive multilateral diplomacy and to
strengthen the role of the EC states as viable Western part-
ners for Third World countries in international politics.
1 . Procedures
The inf rastructrure of the EPC has developed on a purely in-
tergovernmental basis by "linking foreign ministry to for-
eign ministry and embassy to embassy without the inter-
vention of any extranational intermediary”
,
according to
Christopher Hill. 10 All the EPC meetings are chaired by a
representative of the country holding the presidency of the
European Council: the meeting of the heads of governments.
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The presidency rotates every six months in alphabetical or-
der between the Member States. There are at least six mee-
tings per year between the Foreign Ministers, preceeded by
preliminary discussions in the Political Committee composed
of the political directors of the national foreign
ministries. In preparing the work of the Political Committee
each political director is assisted by a specially appointed
"European Correspondent" from his country’s foreign
ministry. The Political Committee holds two-day meetings
every month and is also responsible for managment of the ac-
tivities of working groups. Some of these groups deal with
subjects discussed in international conferences, at the CSCE
meetings, the United Nations or while others are geo-
graphically organized (Middle East, etc.). The working
groups hold approximately one hundred meetings a year. Tn
addition there are countless meetings of the ambassadors of
the Twelve in third countries and in international
organizations. The "Single European Act" asks the Member
States to "intensify co-operation between their representa-
tives accredited to third countries and to international
organizations"
.
1 1
The Political Committee is also the place where U.N.
matters are discussed. The "early warning report " 12 edited
by the twelve missions in New York receives its final appro-
val there. If the Twelve cannot agree on common declarations
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in New York, the controversial issues will be discussed in
the EC Political Committee and later in the EC Council of
Foreign Ministers. The traditional statement of the presi-
dency at the opening session of the G.A. is also received in
the Political Committee after the missions in New York and
before the national foreign ministries have discussed the
report. The Foreign Ministers finally agree on the speech by
consensus
.
The European Council, composed of the heads of states
assisted by their Foreign Ministers, serves as the highest
body for both EPC and EC. The Council convenes three times a
year and is, according to Hill, the "key element in politi-
cal co-operation ”
.
1
3
A distinctive characteristic of the EPC is the direct
contact between the Foreign Ministers and their
functionaries. The regular and free dialogue on all levels
is in contrast to meetings in other organizations, such as
NATO or the Council of Europe. The EPC remains "largely
self-administrating, with the chairman of working groups or
the spokeman ... in international organizations and third
countries providing the documentation and action required on
a decentralized basis. The high number of meetings at all
levels is a significant proof of the intensity of the EPC”,
stated Hill . 14
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By 1986, consultations had become so frequent that the
"Single European Act” included provisions for an EPC
Secretariat. It will have administrative tasks and shall,
according to the Single Act "act under the authority of the
Presidency"
. It "shall assist
...in preparing and implemen-
ting European Political Co-operation activities and in admi-
nistrative matters". The Secretariat shall be composed of
officials, which are to be dispatched by the
Presidency-in-Office
... together with the two preceding
and the two following Presidencies
... for a period covering
five presidencies", is This means that every member serves
two and a half years, namely a full year before, the six
months during and a full year after his country has the
presidency. Thus the Secretariat gets one new member and
looses one every time the presidency changes. The Head of
the Secretariat shall be appointed independently from the
other five members by the Foreign Ministers of the Twelve.
The establishment of a Secretariat - a long standing
proposal of EPC experts in order to improve co-operation -
will mainly influence the EPC process in Europe. Diplomats
at the U.N. do not expect an immediate impact on direct con-
sultations in New York.
The participation of the EC Commission in EPC meetings
at all levels is now an established fact and is helpful in
providing the necessary co-ordination between the economic
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and political fields of Eu ropean co-operation
Consultations with the European Parliament also take
place through the presidency on a regular basis. i«
2 . Instruments
Soon after inception of the EPC the Member States reached
agreement on common basic attitudes toward some foreign po-
licy questions with major importance to all EC Members. The
direct means of EPC are restricted mainly to diplomatic
declarations, communications to other governments, joint
interventions, and common voting in international
organizations. The method of co-operation enables the Twelve
to act on individual facts rather than on well developed
strategies and conceptions.!’ In the 1980’s the Europeans
also started initiatives and common measures in the cases of
the invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran crisis, the situation
in Poland and the Falkland conflict.
The driving force in EPC is the presidency; which is re-
sponsible for the drafting of texts of common declarations,
speeches, and interventions in international organizations.
Decisions of EC and EPC often affect the other forums of
European policy. Because of persistent interactions of
decisions between the two, co-ordination of their policies
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is necessary. This is mainly guaranteed by the participation
Of the European Commission on all EPC levels and the common
presidency in both organ i zat ions
. m some instances EPC
decisions have to be implemented within the framework of
economic co-operation. This includes the imposition of eco-
nomic sanctions against Poland in 1982, against Argentina
during the Falkland conflict or against South Africa in
1986. It also appears when the EPC deals with political
aspects of proposals for economic and financial assistance,
as in the case of its relations to the Central American
states. Conversely, economic co-operation can play a pio-
neering role in political co-operation, as in establishing
relations with the ASEAN countries.
The development of the EPC has experienced success and
failure. The close co-operation in the CSCE as well as EC
policy toward the Middle East were early signs of a succes-
ful agreement on foreign policy issues in the mid-seventies.
At the end of the 1970’s the EPC seemed to have lost
most of its energies; a tendency to merely react to external
events rather than pursuing its own initiatives could be
observed. The early 1980’s saw, according to Stanley Sloane,
"a remarkable revitalization" of EPC.is The crises surroun-
ding Poland and the Falkland Islands confronted the Twelve
with challenges which let the political influence of the EPC
grow
.
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The growth of the importance of EPC consultations in the
1 9 80 ’ s coincided with increased divergencies in the relati-
betueen the United States and its European allies, ac-
cording to Sloane
. Different reactions towards the crises
in Afghanistan and Iran, the establishment of a distinctive
European Middle East policy , 20 and the disagreement over
U.S. intervention in Grenada strained the European-Amer ican
relations. These differences with the United States contri-
buted to EPC growth by making the Europeans desire to achie-
ve a common position in order to be stronger in arguments
with the U.S.
The common declarations of the Foreign Ministers on most
major political crises and issues in the world are the basis
for the co-operation of the Twelve at the General Assembly.
In the 1980’s the EPC council declarations on situations
such as Afghanistan, Kampuchea, the Middle East, South Af-
rica and Central America were reflected in EPC declarations
in the G . A
.
The EPl initiatives and statements clearly demonstrate
the ability of the EC Member States to play a stronger Euro-
pean role based on their own pre-conditions, and possibili-
ties of taking action in most major political fields. With
national interests of Member States at stake the process for
a common position is being complicated and increasingly
elusive. Through the enduring consultations a foreign policy
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promoted
of European dimensions was
( re ) act ion on issues still overshadows
common strategies and concepts in
Twelve
.
2 i
» while the punctual
the concordance of
foreign policy by the
C. EPC CONSULAT IONS AND INSTRUMENTS AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
The General Assembly is a natural showcase of European Poli-
tical Co-operation. Here the Europeans can adopt common po-
sitions on all major political issues in a body which does
not exert great impact on world politics outside the U.N.
The policy of the powerless Third World at the U.N. consists
often in insulting and criticizing the Western minority,
which represents most of the worlds’ economic and military
power. This led to a deminishing importance of the General
Assembly. The major political and economic decisions, in
which the West is interested, are taking place in regionali-
zed bodies such as NATO, the OECD, or in CSCE conferences.
Co-operation is affec ted in New York with less severe bur-
dens than outside of Turtle Bay. The Europeans are confron-
ted at the U.N. with pressure by third states for a unified
apperareance and the achievement of common European
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positions. Third World countries expect co,.o„ positions of
the EC on the North-South dialog and other issues. The often
uniform challenge by developing countries causes the Europe-
ans to confront the Third World with similar elaborate
conceptions. One of the major challenges the Europeans have
to face at the U.N. is to overcome the North-South
conflict
.
2 2
After the Federal Republic of Germany joined in 1973 the
- then nine - were for the first time fully represented at
the G.A., which led to an increasing concordant process in
New York. The enlargement by Greece in 1981 and by Spain and
Portugal in 1986 presented the EPC with new challenges, but
also increased the importance of the EC bloc at the General
Assembly by adding members with for example strong ties to
Latin America or the Middle East . 23
1. Consultation Process
EPC consultation at the U.N. serves two purposes. First, it
provides a process through which the Twelve can speak with
one voice in order to convey European views and bring the
weight of the Twelve to bear. Second, it assists in avoiding
contradictions between national positions expressed by Mem-
ber States individually. The wide range of themes on the
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agenda of the General Assemby made permanent consultation in
the EPC framework in New York as well as in the national ca-
pitals necessary. Major texts on international topics issued
by the meeting of the European Council’s Head of States, or
the Foreign Ministers are furthermore circulated as U.N.
documents
.
The missions of the Twelve and of the EC-Coinmiss ion in
New York act inside the over-all EPC guidelines. The EC Am-
bassadors and representatives in the main committees of the
G.A. meet regulary in order to co-ordinate views and to con-
sider the position to be taken on the anticipated issues.
The Twelve post a yearly report which assesses the co-
operation, analyses the problems, and makes proposals for
improvements. An "early-warning-report" by the missions in
early summer defines the common positions of the Twelve and
gives a preview of the next General Assembly session. This
reflects the identification of problems where harmonizations
and consultations with other states or regional blocs inside
the U.N. system should be considered.
During the regular and special sessions of the G.A.,
meetings on the ambassadorial level convene at least weekly.
These reunions are supplemented by meetings of represen t i ves
in the main committees and in special working groups devoted
to major issues. The rest of the year only weekly meetings
of the ambassadors are held . 24
Even when issues arise in U.N. bodies, with limited
membership, other than the Security Council, consultations
are nevertheless conducted between all EPC members. Common
declarations in these cases represent the positions of all
twelve member states, not just those represented on the
particular body involved. 25
During a session of the G . A
. some 200 or more meetings
may be held covering the entire range of items on the
agenda. This places a heavy burden on the European Council
Presidency, which is responsible for conducting the EPC
meetings, preparing and delivering texts and, together with
other Member States and the Commission, for engaging in the
diplomatic task of ensuring that EC views are reflected in
the resolutions. This burden is particularly onerous for
small EC Member States. Some sense of the burden emerges
from a few basis statistics: during the three month period
® ^ ^ regular General Assembly session about fifty meetings
of U.N. Committees and up to twenty or more EC co-ordination
meetings are held weekly, several hundred resolutions 26 are
adopted and fifty or more common statements of the EC Member
States are delivered. At the 40th session of the G . A
.
Lu-
xemburg held the presidency, but the Dutch delgation took
over the tasks of speaking for the Twelve in the First
Committee
.
As can be seen in Table I, the number of official mee-
42
tings of the Twelve increased steadily in the 1980’s from
176 in 1980 to a peak of 273 in 1984, and slightly declined
to 258 in 1985. During the 40th G
. A
. twenty-three meetings
on the ambassadorial level took place in the three-month
period. The highest number of meetings were reached in the
2nd Committee, which deals with economic and financial
matters. Here the Europeans met seventy-six times while the
committee only convened fifty-two times. The impact of the
strong co-operation through the EEC can clearly be seen. In
the 5th Committee, dealing with administrative and budgetary
matters, the Twelve met thirty times while the committee
held seventy meetings. In the 6th (legal) Committee with
fifty-five meetings the EC had twenty-three offical
meetings. Three EPC meetings took place in the 4th (De-
colonization) Committee, which met twenty— three times in the
40th session. The 1st (Disarmament and related matters) Com-
mittee hold sixty— two meetings, and the EC met seventeen ti-
mes to discuss and elaborate common positions. Tn the 3rd
(Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) Committee the Twelve
convened twenty-four times in an overall number of seventy-
two meetings, and on matters related to the Special Politi-
cal Committee they met eleven times for the preperation of
the forty-six committee meetings. In the last two cases one
has to consider that moreover forty-three EPC meetings of
,
dealing
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experts also took place with issues of mainly these
increasing
two committees. The high, and in recent years
numbers of common meetings is impressive and a sign of a vi-
vid and highly developed co-operation of the EC Member
States in all fields of the United Nations. In economic is-
sues - which fall in the competence of the EEC - and in po-
litical and human rights issues - which are dealt with in
the EPC context - the co-operation of the Twelve measured in
number of meetings was the highest. It has to be noticed
that the high amount of meetings do not by themselves
indicate, whether the consultations resolve or are worsening-
disagreements between the Twelve. This has to be reviewed
during the analysis of the different issues in Chapter
three. The increasing number of issues and the agenda of the
meetings indicate, however, that more and more issues are
being included in the consultations.
The majority of the consultations and elaborations of
common European positions take place between experts and the
representatives in the main committees. These decisions are
adopted "ad referendum", then put forward to the national
ministries for approval. If different positions emerge on
this level, consultations take place on the ambassadorial
level. If consensus is not achived there, the issues are
then discussed first in the Political Committee on the
directorial level, and later on at the ministerial level in
the Council of Foreign Ministers. Differences on minor issu-
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es in New York do not cause the dropping of an intended
speech or declaration, and are either resolved or the matter
is excluded from declarations. Main differences remain on
all levels equally, while most minor discrepancies can be
settled by compromises in New York.
Co-operation in the G.A., as indicated by the number of
meetings, has increased in recent years. The basic positions
and national special interests are well known by the twelve
missions, and despite the fact that common voting is not
mandatory there is always a pressure for common actions from
inside as well as from the outside. Spain and Portugal were,
for example, willing to adjust their positions in areas
where both states’ differences with other members were not
strong
.
Between the members of the European missions a close and
familiar relationship exists which goes far beyond the com-
mon participation in committee meetings. A socialization
process between European diplomats took place in recent ye-
ars which led to a greater sensibility on achieving common
positions and the building of a common European view. A ge-
neral desire for achieving common positions is sustained
between the diplomats, which is mostly independent from
parties that form the national governments in Europe.
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TABLE I
1980
NUMBER OF MEETINGS OF THE TWELVE
AT THE
—40TH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Total: 258
Number of Meetings 35th - 39th G.A.
:
176 1981: 245 1982: 285 1983: 208 1984 :
EC Meetings at 40th G.A. :
*
Permanent Representatives: 23
40th Anniversary of United Nations : 8
Experts Middle East: 23
Experts Asia: 4
Experts Africa: 13
Experts Latin America: 3
1st Committee: 17 ( 62 )
Special Political Committee: 1
1
(46)
2nd Committee
:
76 ( 52 )
3rd Commitee 24 ( 72 )
4th Committee: 3 ( 23 )
5th Committee: 30 (70)
6th Committee: 23 (55)
258
* : The Parantheses indicate the relevant numbers of
the committee meetings
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I
ndication of Common Positions Vis-A-Vis Others
The Twelve indicate common positions to other blocs and
states at the General Assembly in five different forms:
-proposal of agenda items
-common proposal of draft resolutions
-declarations in the plenary’s general debate
-declarations on specific resolutions
-explanation of vote
The proposal of special agenda items and the drafting of re-
solutions is in general complicated for the West by reason
of its minority position, whereas the Third World majority
can dictate any agenda point, and is - if applied - in most
cases performed by individual EPC Member States. The remai-
ning three points account for the usual presentation of EPC
positions at the General Assembly. 27
The G . A . opens each session with a general debate in
which members can make a statement about its view of the
world situation. The Twelve make, during that opening sessi-
on a common statememt through the Foreign Minister, current-
ly acting as EC Council President. This speech became cu-
stomory during all the 1980’s. The speech provides a summary
of EC positions on international issues and sets the stage
for declarations on specific subjects later in the session.
4 7
The statement is drawn up through a process involving both
EPC and Community institutions. Statements in the general
debate are "orientation" elements for the members of the
G.A. and the EC statement is a considered presentation of
European views, and is examined accordingly by other states
and groups in determining their own positions. Because there
is no systematic presentation on behalf of any other group
in the general debate and statements in that debate are of
considerable significance for the structure of U.N. debates,
the EC statement offers an important opportunity on determi-
ne the role of the Twelve in the G.A. The issues involved in
this general statement have increased over the years. The
speech on Sept. 23, 1985 of the Foreign Minister of
Luxemburg, Jacques Poos, "on behalf of the European
Community, its Member States and Spain and Portugal" covered
all current controversial issues in world politics;
disarmament, human rights and economic questions, the situa-
tions in Cyprus, South Africa, Namibia, Middle East, Horn of
Africa, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Central America and Korea. No
major political crisis was left in which the Europeans did
not have common positions. 28
Common declarations in debates on individual agenda
items have defined the fundamentals of European policy. The-
se declarations set the essential line for further diplom-
atic actions by the Twelve. On issues where the Twelve
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agree
,
these declarations explain the common European posi-
tron in large. On issues dividing the Twelve, these
declarations express the minimal consensus; national
declarations then state more precisely the individual posi-
tions of Member States. The custom of common European
declarations has increased in the 1980’s, as can be seen
from Table II.
Declarations of the Twelve on specific resolutions eit-
her m the plenary debate or in committees tend to be more
fundamental. The intentions of declarations as well as those
of explanations of votes by the Twelve are also designed to
influence the voting behavior of still undecided states
shortly before the final vote
. Especially neutral western
or moderate Third World countries often consider a common
action by the Twelve in their own decision making process.
Despite a common explanation of vote by the EPC, individual
Member States often dissent from the majority in certain
paragraphs or parts of resolutions. In these cases the dis-
sent is expressed by national explanations of votes.
At the 40th G.A. the Twelve made seventy-nine
declarations to announce their common positions, which is a
decline in the number of statements compared to all the pre-
vious sessions since the accession of Greece in 1981, but
still higher than in most of the sessions between 1974 and
1980 as can be seen in Table II. The number of common
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declarations rose largely in the 1980’s, while the number of
explanation of votes declined steadily in the same period.
n the 40th G.A. fifty-two common declarations and fifteen
explanation of votes were delivered by the presidency. The
number of declarations on resolutions increased in 1985,
however, to eleven. An explanation of common vote can be ta-
ken as the strongest common statement, indicating that all
Member States voted the same way; a common declaration, on
the other hand, can be accessed as the weakest form of
indicating common positions. By looking at the development
of the different indicators of common positions in the
1980’s, it can be argued, that through the accession of
Greece in 1981, and the high number of its dissenting
votes 29
,
the EC was less able to make common explanations of
vote. The Twelve instead switched over to common
declarations to express common views, even if individual
Member States differed on certain parts of the relevant is-
sues occass i onal ly
.
By observing the range of matters on which common views
were demonstrated in the 40th G.A., the wide field of common
positions is revealed. Twelve statements or explanations of
vote were made on Middle East topics (Palestinian issues and
Israel, UNRWA, Iran-Iraq and Lebanon), five on South Africa
and Namibia, as well as statements on Kampuchea, Afghanistan
and the situation in Central America. Eight statements were
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given on security and disarmament topics; eight in the Third
Committee (human rights and humanitarian and social issues),
thirteen in the Fith Committee (budget and personnel),, and
nine in the Sixth Committee (legal topics). Sixteen
statements were produced on economic and development issues,
chiefly in the Second Committee, whereas eight were put for-
ward by the European Commission on behalf of the European
Communities while the other eight statements were delivered
by the presidency of the Twelve.
A statement or explanation of vote on behalf of the EC
possesses a weight which individual declarations cannot
have. U.N. diplomacy entails the construction of alliances
between groups and the putting together of majorities, and
if the Twelve are not united on an issue of importance not
°nl> are the chances of that view being accepted itself re-
duced but the individual states are usually left without an
effective means of proceeding. The EPC framework provides
such a base and proves especially effective when the Twelve
are able to cast common explanation of votes, and can
moreover, attract the attention of other groups at the G.A.
Statements in United Nations debates tend to be written
in general political terms rather than in detail, which co-
incides with EPC practice. There is usually consensus on
fundamental objectives; the familiar difficulties over ends
and means, the elements of tactical considerations, and the
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particular interests of individual Member States
make the drafting of common statements difficult. Since ap-
plying the EPC in New York, the number of common
declarations has increased from zero to seventy-nine in
1985. While the number of 123 declarations in 1981 was ex-
ceptionally high, the numbers of statements since then has
remained around eighty to ninety. It could be argued that
the correlation between a larger number of meetings, and
statements and cooperation depends on the content of these
meetings or statements. One clear position is worth more
than four or five vague ones. The stagnation of the number
of meetings in the 1980’s contradicts the fact that an
increasing number of issues were included in the consultati-
ons in the 1980 s and that the EPC is more active than at
the end of the seventies. Whether this immutability in the
number of common statements since 1979 is also reflected in
the voting data will be seen in the following chapters.
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TABLE II
TOTAL NUMBER OF EUROPEAN STATEMENTS AT THE GENKRAI. isamiv
Survey of common declarations I od ) , declarations on
resolutions t dr ) , motion s on the procedure ( mp ) and
expli cation of common votes(ecv)
4-0 1
h
—session of* the General Assembly!
1985 79 ( cd : 52
,
ecv : 15, dr : 11 mp : 1 )
Prev ious sessions of the General Assembly:
1984 86 ( cd : 56
,
ecv : 2 5
,
dr : 5 )
1983 84 (cd: 58 ecv : 23 dr : 3 )
1982 90 ( cd : 5 1 ecv : 30 dr : 9 )
1981 123 (cd: 64 ecv : 5 9 )
1980 69 (cd: 30 ecv : 39 )
1979 82 ( cd : 26 ecv : 5 4 dr : 2 )
1978 72 (cd: 27 ecv : 4.5 )
1977 61 (cd: 25 ecv : 36
)
1976 50 ( cd : 20 ecv : 30
1975 36
1974 15
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3
. Observer Status of the European Economic Community
In 1974 the European Economic Community (EEC) obtained ob-
server status at the U.N. General Assembly. This permits a
representative of the the EC as an entity to participate in
meetings of the Assembly plenary, main committees and subsi-
diary organs without vote . 3 o This includes the right to
speak m committees when questions concerning the Community
interest are being discussed, it does not include the right
to vote or to make proposals.
The EC observer mission is "bicephalous in nature
. .
.
,
that
is to say made up of representatives of the state exercising
the Presidency of the Council at the time and representati-
ves of the Commission", stated Hardy. 3 i The function of the
EEC delegation consists in representing the Community and
maintaining contacts with the U.N. and the missions of third
states. Besides this external diplomatic activity it is, ac-
cording to Hardy, "particulary concerned with the task of
encouraging the co-ordination of the positions of Member
States and seeking to ensure that EC cohesion is
safeguarded." 32 The delegation also provides the connection
between Brussels and New York, including the supply of
information on Community activities relating to U.N.
matters
.
The delegates of the EEC Commission in New York participate
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Without exception in the consultation process of the EPC at
Turtle Bay. Whether statements are made "on behalf of the
Member States of the European Community" and/or on behalf of
the Community depends on the subject matter. The Twelve are
committed to operate as a unit on all matters coming under
the Treaty of Rome, in principle all economic issues, where
they have delegated certain powers and functions to the
Commission. As a result "in the Economic and Social Council
and in the Second Committee of the G.A., they make
statements through a common spokesman", mostly the represen-
tative of the EC Commission, observed Kaufmann. 3 3 Because
the Second Committee deals with issues and policies which
most frequently fall within the Community framework and whe-
re Community co-ordination and practices are best
established, common positions among the Twelve are
particular^ strong. Here the Twelve play a "important role
and maintain a greater degree of cohesion . . . than in the
other Committees", according to Hardy
.
34
Most issues raised in the Assembly do not come within Com-
munity competence in a strict legal sense; some, however, do
include related subsidiary questions i nvol v i ng EC
competence. Examples include aid to refugees, and other
forms of assistance in the Middle East and elsewhere. On
these particular aspects, then, there are
in EPC declarations of the Community.
5 5
regular references
The correlation between Community and EPC elements can be
also seen in the relations with the ASEAN Group and Central
American states. The ASEAN co-operation agreement in 1980
provided the basis for economic and development co-operation
between the two regions. This includes holding EC-ASEAN mee-
tings twice a year at the Ministerial level for discussion
of political and economic issues. This development has also
led to increasing contacts and co-operation between the ASE-
AN group and the Twelve in New York. The relations with the
Central American states and the support by the EC for the
Contadora Group were initiated during the opening of the
1983 Assembly session, when a meeting on the ministerial le-
vel was held in New York. Further contacts were established
through conferences of foreign ministers held in San Jose in
September 1984, and in Luxemburg in November 1985. 3 s These
meetings led to common statements by the Twelve at the G.A.
supporting the Contadora process.
56
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO
!• Permanent Mission
Nations ( ed ) , Speech
behalf of the European
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panying Memorandum (New
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delivered by Sir Geoffrey
Community and its Twelve
General Assembly together with
York, September 23, 1986)
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Uni ted
Howe on
Member
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G.A. Resolution 3050(XXVIII) September 18, 1973.
3.
The description of the EPC in this chapter is mainly ba-
sed on interviews with European diplomats at the United Na-tions in New York and in the Federal Foreign Ministry inBonn. The following books deal in general with the EPC and
can be used for further overall informations about the EPC:Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau ( ed ) , The External Relations
ol the European Community (Lexington, 1974); H Fonseca-Wollheim, Ten Fears of European Political Cooperation(Brusseis, 1981); Christopher Hill ( ed ) , National ForeignPolicies and European Political Cooperation (London, 1983);Heinz Kramer and Reinhard Rummel, Gemeinschaf tsbi ldung West-
europas in der AuBenpolitik : Zur Tragfahigkeit der Europai-
schen Politischen Zusammenarbei t (EPZ) (Baden-Baden, 1978);
Reinhard Rummel and Wolfgang Wessels ( eds ) , Die Europaische
Politische Zusammenarbei
t
(Bonn, 1978); Ph
. de Schoutheete,
La Cooperation Politique Europeene (Brussels, 1980); Phillip
Taylor, When Europe speaks with one Voice: The External Re-
lations of the European Community (Westport, 1979) and K.J.
Twichett, ( ed ) , Europe and the World: The External Relations
of the Common Market (London, 1976).
4.
See for documentation of the EPC reports: Commission of
the European Communities ( ed )
,
Bulletin of the European Com-
munities (Brussels 1970-1985)
; Presse und Informat ionsamt
der Bundesregierung ( ed )
,
Europaische Politische Zusammenar-
bei t (EPZ), Documentation of the Federal Government of the
Federal Republic of Germany, 5th Edition (Bonn, 1981).
5.
See for a documentation of the "Solemn Declaration for a
European Union": Presse und Informat ionsamt der Bundesreg Le-
rung ( ed
)
,
Feierliche Deklaration zur Europaischen Union vom
19. Juni 1983
,
Bulletin of the Federal Government, 65 (Bonn,
June
, 21, 1983).
6.
See reports in New York Times 4 December 1985,
and Neue Zurcher Zeitung 2/3 March 1986.
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Parliament and the European Community as a whole Juliet Lod-
ge ( ed
.
) , Institutions and Policies of the European Communi-
ty (London, 1983) ,pp. 33-36.
17. See Kramer and Rummel, op. cit., pp. 20-25 and Vessels
and Rummel, op. cit., pp . 29-34.
18. Stanley R. Sloan, "Wege zu einem neuen t ransatlan ti
-
schen Obereinkommen: Die Europaische Politische Zusammenar-
beit ( EPZ
)
als Instrument der Konsensbi ldung
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enice De°laration of 13 June 1980 was the result
^
evelopment of a common European attitude towards theM
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EaStpr°blem and 1S built on two main principles’ theright to existence and security of all States in the regionincluding Israel, and self-determination of thePalestinians.
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op. cit., pp 20-24define these two points more widely as "communaute de
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22.
Most of the information in this as in the following
chapters are mainly based on interviews conducted in NewYork and Bonn. Beate Lindemann, EG-Staaten und VereinteNationen : Die Politische Zusammenarbeit der Neun in den UN-Hauptorganen (Munchen, 1978), is one of the few detailed
studies about the EC-Member States at the United Nations,dealing with the co-operation of the EC in the mid-
seventies. Especially this work led to my interest on this
subject and to the intention to analyze EC co-operation du-
ring the 1980’s. See also the following two articles about
the EC at the U.N. in the 1970’s: N. Hammer, "Die Europa.i-
sche Politische Zusammenarbeit bei den Vereinten Nationen"
Europa-Archiv
,
15 (1975), 493-500; and R. Foot, "The Euro-
pean Community’s Voting Behaviour at the United Nations Ge-
neral Assembly", Journal of Common Market Studies, 17(1979), 350-360.
23. The offical accession of Spain and Portugal to the Eu-
ropean Communities and EPC took place on January 1, 1986,
but they began full participation in the EPC and EC frame-
work in New York already on September 1, 1985. This enabled
me to analyse the co-operation of all twelve Member States
at the 40th General .Assembly.
24. On 28 April-9 May and on 20 June 1986 a special session
of the G.A. took place on the critical economic situation in
Africa and the current financial crisis of the United
Nations. This special session is excluded in the data from
the 40th G.A. where only the regular G.A. from 17 September-
18 December 1985 was analyzed.
25. This is true in the Economic and Social Council with
fifty-five members and with a maximum number of thirteen
Western states and other principal organs and subsidary bo-
dies of the G.A.
59
26 .
from
1985 .
The
132
number of resolutions has
in 1965 to 178 in 1975,
increased over
227 in 1980 and
the years
to 259 in
27
of
See Apendix III for an enumeration of allstatements by the Twelve in the 40th G.A.
three forms
28.
1985
See speech of Jacques Poos,
in G.A. Records A/40/PV6.
Luxemburg
,
September 24,
29. The di
States will
ssenting votes of Greece
be discussed in large in
and the other
Chapter III.
Member
30. G.A. Resolution 3208(XXIX) of 11 Octobe
which the EEC was invited "to participate in
and work of the General Assembly in the
observer"
.
r 1974, under
the sessions
capacity of
31. Michael Hardy,
Nations", forthcoming
The European Community and
article; p. 2.
the United
32
. Ibid.
, p. 3 .
,
, 1 f
ohan Kaufmann, United Nations Decision Making(Rockville, 1980), pp . 96-97.
34. Hardy, op. cit., p. 8.
35. See report in Neue Ziircher Zeitung, November 14, 1985.On the occasion of the meeting in Luxemburg a economic co-
operation treaty was signed, furthermore, between the EC andthe participating Latin American states.
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CHAPTER III
POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF EPC
In the past decade the EPC has matured in world politics and
specially at the United Nations to a highly sophisticated
element of European integration. The EPC is acknowledged by
foreign diplomats at the U.N as an important common facili-
tating factor, while the public and many foreign diplomats
are puzzled by the different parts of the European integra-
tion process. The role of the Twelve is attracting the at-
tention of other groups, whether the Group of 77, the ASEAN
or Contadora Groups or the African States. These and others
have come to expect the Twelve to speak with one voice and
act in a co-ordinated manner; this has added to the import-
ance of the EC as a group in New York. This chapter examines
how the Twelve have responded to these expectations.
Moreover, the southern enlargement of the European Community
by Greece in 1981 and recently by Spain and Portugal brought
three old European cultures and Mediterranean states into a
community uptil then largely dominated by Middle and Nort-
hern European states. These new states affected the feature
of the European Community, now including most of the Western
European states, at the U.N’s General Assembly. The competi-
tion of national versus European interests in the decision-
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making process of national states is also a weighty factor
for the success or failure of the EPC. The permanent mem-
bership of France and the United Kingdom in the Security-
Council and the special role of these two states in the U.N.
organization affects also the position of the European
Community, and the co-operation of its Member States in the
EPC at Turtle Bay.
A. OVERALL VOTING PATTERNS
The solidarity of the Twelve and the co-ordination of
their U.N. policy can be observed most clearly in their vo-
tes in the G.A. This is true even with the Assembly’s
increasing tendency to adopt resolutions by consensus. More
than fifty percent of all resolutions and decisions in each
session of the G.A. were adopted in recent years by
consensus. In the 40th G.A. 197 out of 353 resolutions and
decisions were adopted by consensus. Except on budget
items, elections, internal U.N. operations, and a few
special questions, Assembly resolutions are nonbinding, and
through the one-state-one-vo te rule - which gives the United
States and Vanuatu one single vote at the G.A. - are obvi-
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ously not an accurate
influence
sus at the
in world
United
politic
Nations
measure of real national power or
s. The function of seeking consen-
is described by M.J. Peterson as:
"a procedure for attempting to reconciledifferences and arrive at a desicion allcan accept, if not positively endorse.
onsensus owes its prominence both tolong-standing international traditionthat states are subject only to thosedirectives they impose on themselves andto the fact that control over votes inthe Assembly does not correlate perfectly
with control over capability in the in-ternational system. Lacking control of
ancillary institutions capable of
enforcing resolutions on states, the As-
sembly majority must secure implementati-
on by persuasion rather than by
coercion " . 1
Yet many decisions are made by voting as notes, that votes
are a better indication of behavior in the General
Assembly, since contested issues are more likely to mirror
real-world problems". 2
.1^ Noting Pattern and EC Enlargement
For the Europeans the negotiation of texts for consensus re-
solutions constitute, nonetheless, an important way in which
to influence Third World countries in order to weaken extre-
me positions. Common EC positions are reflected more in con-
sensus resolutions while resolutions decided by vote reflect
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case with
often disunity of the Twelve, as it is also the
the G
. A
. as a whole. One of the few notable decisions adop-
ted by consensus in the 40th G.A. dealt with the "Critical
Economic Situation in Africa". 3 and in a special G.A. sessi-
on in Paris. Here consensus was achieved by pragmatic co-
operation between the West - with the EC carrying the main
burden on the Western side - and the African states.
The expansion of EC membership from nine to twelve has
had mixed impact on the EPC process. The accession of Greece
in 1981 to the European Community followed nearly simulta-
neously a major shift in Greece’s domestic policy: The pro-
European conservative party lost power to the socialist
party under the newly elected Prime Minister Papandreou
,
whose election was based on an anti-EC platform. This, and
the positions Greece took in foreign policy issues
thereafter, led to an often isolationist position in the Eu-
ropean Community. This made the consensus process at the Ge-
neral Assembly between the Europeans from 1981 on more
complicated. The participation of Spain and Portugal in the
EPC process in New York, on the other hand, was led by pro-
European governments which were willing to make concessions
and adopt established European positions in fields in which
both countries did not possess strong interests.
As can be seen in Table III, which compares common EC
positions at the G.A. from 1975 to 1985, the EPC extended
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its common positions "ho q/i aP 1 c t 84.0 percent in 1978 while a decline
of about 10 percent occured in the 1980’s. The percentage of
positions in each session, including the number of
consensus resolutions, declined from 80.9 percent in 1980 to
77.3 percent in 1981 and reached its lowest in 1983, when
the EC could agree only in 68.0 percent of all resolutions
(see Table III), After that the common positions increased
slightly to 70.9 percent in 1985 (the first year of
participation by Spain and Portugal in the EPC process). By
analyzing, if the South enlargement of the EC affected the
voting patterns in the 1980’s in any way, it can be
observed, that by excluding the dissenting votes of Spain
and Portugal for 1985 and Greece since 1981, the average for
the four sessions since 1981 rates 79.3 percent, compared
With 71.4 percent for the same period if the three South Eu-
ropean states are included. Thus the common voting patterns
of the, uptil 1980 nine Member States, declined only slig-
thl> in the 1980’s, compared with the equivalent rates of
these nine members in the 1970's.
In one important aspect, however, the above figures are
misleading because consensus resolutions always make up more
than 50 percent of all resolutions adopted at the G.A. Many,
though not all, of them deal with routine or trivial matters
on which there is no disagreement, in the common voting pat-
including them, then, makes EPC co-
6 5
terns of the EPC .
operation appear more effective than it is actually.
An analysis based solely on resolutions adopted by vote gi-
ves a more reliable measure of EPC consensus. In such cases,
EC members are not under pressure to set objections aside
for the sake of Assembly-wide consensus. If they agree with
each other, this results mainly from the EPC process.
Table IV compares the votes of the Member States in the
General Assembly for all G.A. sessions between 1975 and
1985. It indicates, that the EPC achieved its peak - measu-
red by votes - in 1978 with 65.5 percent of common votes.
However, the voting declined in the two following sessions
and the common vote after the accession of Greece in 1981
arrived in the 36th session at 47.8 percent, declining to
30.7 percent in 1983 and rising again to 41.5 percent in the
first year of the Spanish and Portugese participation. Du-
ring all that time the common vote remained under the re-
sults from the late 1970’s. In the 1980’s a decline of com-
mon votes on an average of nearly 20 percent compared wi th
the favorable voting patterns in the 1970’s, could be
observed. By excluding the votes of Greece since 1981 and of
Spain and Portugal for 1985 again a minor decrease can be
observed. The remaining nine Member States voted in 1981 in
65.4 percent of all controversial resolutions together;
nearly reaching the high number of 1978. Nevertheless, also
here a decline can be observed, reaching the lowest point in
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1983 with 49.4 percent, and rising in the two following ses-
sions to 54.9 percent for 1985. The decline of common votes
by excluding the three new EC Member States in the 1980>s
- remained, however, with slighter differences to the voting
patterns in the 1970’s.
From 1975 - 1985 the average common voting pattern for
the EPC was 50.5 percent; for the six sessions from 1975 -
1980, before the accession of Greece, it was 59.78 percent;
after 1981 the average declined sharply for the remaining
sessions to 39.3 percent. By excluding the votes of Greece
and then of Spain and Portugal for 1985 the average' for the
period between 1975-85 is 58.1 percent and for 1981-85 it is
56.2 percent
.
The decline of the common voting patterns in the 1980’s
is largely due to the "negative” influence of the membership
of Greece. But, even without this "trouble factor", a
stagnation has appeared indicating that the EPC seemed to be
unable to transfer the increase in consultations to an
increase in common voting.
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TABLE III
COMPARISON OF COMMON EC POSITIONS AT THF r, a
Survey of co„on positions on resolution s, amendment.
paragraphs adop t ed by consensus (CONS), com.nn vote
LCV) or divided vote ( DV ) ln the r.. A
. from 197R-1Q«^
YEAR CONS CV TOTAL % VD %
1985 197 81 ( 107 ) 287 ( 304
)
70.9(77.6) 114(88) 29.1(22.4)
1984 201 66 ( 104) 267 ( 305 68.5(78.2) 123(85) 31.5(21.8)
1983 205 54(87) 259(292 68.0(76.6) 122 ( 89) 32.0(23.4)
1982 196 7 4 ( 100) 270( 296 ) 72.2(79.1) 104(78) 27.8(20.9)
1981 206 76 ( 104 ) 282(310) 77.3(84.9) 83(55) 22.7(15.1)
1980 195 68 263 80
.
9
62 19.1
1979 203 97 300 82
.
2
64 17.8
1978 167 95 262 84 .
0
50 16.0
1977 166 67 233 83 .
5
46 16.5
1976 158 61 219 82 .
3
4 7 17.7
1975 1 10 66 176 83 .
4
35 16.6
Average %
Average %
1975-1985
1981-1985
77.6
71.4(79.3)
22 .
4
39.6(20.7)
*• parenthesis are the relevant numbers exluding the
votes of Greece since 1981 and those of Spain and Portugal
in 1985
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TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF EC VOTES AT THE G.A.
Survey of common votes (CV
I
and divided votes l nv I „„
resolutions
,
—
amendments and separate paragraphs i n t.he r. a
from 1975-1986*
YEAR TOTAL VOTES CV % DV %
1985 195 81(107) 41.5(54.9) 114(88) 58.5(45. 1 )
1984 189 6 6 ( 104) 34.9(55.0) 123(85) 65.1(45. 0)
1983 176 54 (87) 30.7(49.4) 122(89 ) 69.3(50. 6 )
1982 178 74 ( 100
)
41.6(56.2) 104(78) 58.4(43. 8 )
1981 159 76 ( 104 ) 47.8(65.4) 83 (55) 52.2(34. 6)
1980 130 68 52 .
3
62 4 7.7
1979 162 97 59
.
9
65 40 . 1
1978 145 95 65.5 50 34 .
5
1977 113 67 59 . 46 40
.
7
1976 108 61 56
.
4
47 43 .
6
1975 101 66 65 . 35 34 . 7
Average
Average
% 197 5-
% 1981-
1985 50
1985 39
.5(58.1)
.3(56.2)
49.5(41.9)
60.7(43.8)
*
‘
in parenthesis are the relevant numbers excluding the vo-
te of Greece since 1981 and that of Spain and Portugal in
1985
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2_!—National Interests and Minority Positinnc
The leitmotiv, according to diplomats of all missions, for
the twelve European states at the U.N. consists in reaching
a consensus position within EPC. Visions and reality are of-
ten wide apart as can be observed in the amount of divided
votes cast by the Twelve. The proportion of divided votes
ranged from a low of 34.5 percent of all resolutions adopted
by vote in 19i8 to a high of 69.3 percent at the 38th s^si-
on in 1983 (see Table IV). 4 0n average, nearly half of all
resolutions brought to a vote in the G . A . have caused
disagreemts inside EPC since 1975.
This result in the Assembly mirrors the wider EPC
process. The lengthy negotiations preceeding the adoption of
the Singel European Act indicated, however, that the natio-
nal governments remain very reluctant to concede certain
rights in pursuing their foreign policy to a common foreign
policy. The EPC is still a non-binding decision-making
process, thus allowing the Member States to follow their own
national interests. National interests and positions,
influenced by domestic concerns or special relations to ot-
her states, either in the Third World or in other groups,
often determine the voting of individual Member States rat-
her than permanent pressure to gain common positions at the
G. A.
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ere
The issuing of common declarations, even in cases wh
the positions differed on certain aspects between members,
became a common practice in recent years. This practice all-
ows the Twelve to circulate broad and general statements ex-
cluding controversial sub-issues. Dissenting members then
indicate their views on the sub-issues in individual expla-
nations of votes. On the other hand, common explanations of
votes by the Twelve are only made in cases where they achie-
ved consensus on the relevant resolution. This practice was
rationalized by the enlargement of the EC first from nine to
ten and then to twelve member states, which complicated the
process of finding common positions. A further reason for
this development can also be seen in the growth of eonsulta-
ons on all major issues without solving remaining specific
differences. For analyzing the minority voting patterns the
following three tables were used: Table V evaluates the num-
bers of EC votes in the 40th G.A.; Table VI indicates the
number of minority votes cast by a Member State in the 40th
G.A., and Table VII reviews the minority votes for the peri-
od since 1981. Moreover the data in Appendix I and II was
included as well.
In the 40th G . A
. the vote of the Twelve differed in 111
resolutions or 58.5 percent of all resolutions adopted by
vote that seesion. The minority votes cast by the Twelve can
be divided into resolutions where a Member State was i so la-
ted within the EC or was joined by different partners. Thus
an isolated minority, a minority of two, a minority of
three, a minority of four or a minority of five Member
States can be found. Most of these votes occurred as "no-
abstain or yes-abstain" splits between EC majority and
minority. Since abstention is a mild form of expressing re-
servations about a proposal, these splits are less severe
than "yes-no" splits. Another sort of minority vote is the
three-way-split", when some members vote in favor, some
oppose, and some abstain, often indicating that no strong
majority can be found in the EC. The extreme case of minori-
ty votes can be found in cases where votes are diametrically
opposed to each other. This means that while the majority
voted either with yes or no, the minority voted exactly the
opposite without any abstention cast in the EC bloc.
Fifteen times a Member State was isolated with its vote
in the EPC bloc. Here Greece cast nine times and France,
mainly on disarmament questions, four times, the dissenting
votes. In twenty-one resolutions two members were in a mino-
rity position: Greece was thereby in seventeen cases in a
minority and Spain in twelve cases part of that minority.
Nineteen times three Member States and thirteen times four
Member States were together in a minority. Five times five
of the Member States differed from the EC majority. Three-
way-split votes occured on thirty-three resolutions,
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mostly
Without a strong majority voting any one way. Three-way-
s p 1 its were cast largely in the 1st committee on disarmament
questions and on some resolutions on the Middle East and
South Africa. Diametrically opposed votes occured only three
times m the 40th G.A. In one resolution Greece was the
single European state in favor of a resolution condemning
Israeli nuclear armament, while all other eleven states vo-
ted against it. In two other resolutions, also on
disarmament questions, Ireland and Greece found themselves
opposed to the rest of the EC
.
5 This low number of
diametrically opposed votes is an indication that a small
minority tries if possible to avoid totally opposite positi-
ons to those of the large majority. 6
The number of times a country is in the minority in the
EPC correlates mostly closely with the number of years a
member state participated actively in the EC and how it is
integrated in the European context. The three Benelux states
are by far the most integrated states in the EPC as
indicated by their low number of dissenting votes; they are
basically the political core of the EPC in New York. Luxem-
burg holding the EPC chair in the 40th G.A., and traditio-
nally the most integrated state in the EC, found itself only
in five resolutions in the minority during the 1980’s, and
did not even cast any dissenting vote during its presidency
in 1985. 7 Belgium has also an impressive low number of mino-
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me
nty votes for the same period, and differed only one ti
from the European mainstream in 1985, when it abstained on a
resolution about the implementation of the "Declaration on
denuclearization of Africa",. Ten years ago the Netherlands
was one of the most radical European countries in economic
and disarmament issues. While at that time its position was
often closer to non-aligned states, it integrated itself in
the 1 980
’ s into the mainstream of the EPC. The Netherlands
dissented five times during the last year, and correlated on
most issues with its partners in Benelux. Especially in hu-
man right questions it kept a progessive position, which re-
sulted in additional national declarations beside those of
the presidency.
As founding members of the EC, Italy and the Federal Re-
public of Germany share the same economic, social and poli-
tical preconditions and belong also to the European
mainstream. Italy was in a minority position five times in
1985, while the Federal Republic of Germany dissented seven
times. The dissenting votes of Italy remained relatively
constant during the 1980’s while German minority positions
increased in 1983 to a high of eighteen. Italy is more ra-
dical than its Federal German counterpart on issues when
geographic, historical and economic ties makes it more
advisable, as in the case of the Middle East and Palestine
questions. The same concern is given to South Africa issues
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Where the Federal Republic and the United Kingdom were the
least anxious states to support economic sanctions as
demanded by the Third World majority. The only resolution
the Federal Republic found itself in a nearly isolated
minority, along with the United Kingdom, was its abstention
on the "Law of the Sea" issue.
. In three resolutions concer-
ning the question of Namibia, the Federal Republic abstained
together with France and the United Kingdom, *. thus staying
in consensus with the Namibia-Group rather than with the Eu-
ropean Community
.
1 1 These were the only decisions in the
40th G
. A
. in which the Federal Republic found itself in a
minority position, shared with less than three partners. The
Federal Republic of Germany voted only once, in 1981,
against the rest of the EC, thus remaining the only one-
minority vote by the Federal Republic in the 1980’s. Italy,
on the other hand, did not even cast one single one or two-
minority vote since 1981.
Two other Member States could be found in the European
center during most of the 1980’s in the EPC mainstream, na-
mely France and the United Kingdom. The position of both
states is characterized by certain aspects which
differentiates them from their European partners. As perma-
nent members of the Security Council and as nuclear powers
they often pursue special interests in security matters, and
in disarmament questions. Because both have special ties to
former colonies and still administer small colonial
questions
enclaves, they re more sensitive in decolonization
and problems.
France voted in the 40th G.A. eighteen times in opposi-
tion to its European partners, and voted in a similar pat-
tern during all the 1980’s. It pursues special interests in
questions related to Africa and disarmament. At the 40t.h
session it was four times in a one-minority position, whe-
reby three issues dealt with disarmament questions . 12 France
was also isolated on the question of the "Comoran island of
Mayotte". 13 Most of French dissent with the European main-
stream occurred in the 1st committee on disarmament
questions; especially when France’s role as a nuclear power
was involved, In Namibia issues, France joined the Federal
Republic and the United Kingdom in their minority positions
as members of the Namibia-Group
; France also took a more ra-
dical position than most of its European partners on Central
American issues.
The position of the United Kingdom in recent years came
closer to the European mainstream, It voted within the mino-
rity about twenty a session at the beginning of the 1980’s,
but cast only eleven dissenting votes in the 40th G.A. Its
special relations to other Commonwealth states mean that on
certain issues the United Kingdom is able to "tackle" some
countries, and to transmit EC positions to the Third World
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bloc. Similarly to France. it had in disarmament questions
in the 1st committee the highest number of dissenting posi-
tions to the rest of its partners. Together with the Federal
Republic, the United Kingdom abstained on the "Law of Sea"
-
resolution, and the three above mentioned Namibia
resolutions. Moreover, it took a firmer stance against sanc-
tions on South Africa than most of its partners. Its only
one minority vote was cast on the resolution about "Public
Information and Public Action against Apartheid" , i s where it
abstained while all other eleven Europeans voted in favor.
On the "Question of the Falkland Islands ( Malvinas ) "j 6 the
European vote was split in three-ways, the U.K. casting the
only "no" vote, while four other European states voted in
favor of the resolutions and the remaining states abstained.
In recent years, Denmark narrowed slightly its gap with
the European mainstream; with seventeen minority votes in
1985, compared with sixteen in the 39th and twenty-four in
the 38th session and only nine in 1981. While it adjusted to
the EC majority on some issues it, however, remained more
radical than most of its partners in certain fields, such as
human rights, social questions, and disarmament issues, whe-
re Denmark cast most of its dissenting votes. On admini-
strative and budget questions in the 5th committee its posi-
tions were often in conflict with its European partners.
Denmark was involved in five of eight divided votes in that
77
a reso-
commi ttee
, and it cast its only two-minority vote on
lution of the 5th committee. It approved the resolution on a
"Working Capital Fund for the Biennium”
i
7 while Spain rejeQ _
ted it, and the other Europeans abstained. The fact that
Denmark cast just a single one-minority vote since 1981 and
only four two-minority votes, less than the Federal
Republic, France or the United Kingdom in the same time,
indicates that it is not isolated within its minority posi-
tions but always accompanied by some other member states.
Ireland belongs more to the "hardliners "
h
of the Euro-
pean Community, which include Greece and Spain. In all secu-
rity and military questions Ireland, as the only non-NATO
member of the EC, finds itself in an outsider position, most
of its twenty-seven minority votes in 1985 were cast on
disarmament questions. In many economic questions it is so-
metimes closer to Third World countries than to its European
partners; in human right and social questions, Ireland is
also more radical than most of the other Europeans states.
All seven two-minority votes were issued together with
Greece on disarmament questions in the 40th session. Worth
noting is that Ireland cast only 3 one-minority votes
throughout all the 1980’s, indicating that, despite its high
number of minority votes in the last years, it is not wil-
ling to stand alone. In cases of a single dissent inside the
EPC the pressure by the other member states on that dissen-
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ting country to achieve consensus is relatively strong and a
member state is therefore less reluctant to change its sing-
le position.
The same analysis can be made concerning Spain, which
despite its second highest number of dissenting votes
(namely thirty-seven in 1985), cast only one single one-
mmority vote on an administrative and budget resolution, i*
Spain and Portugal as new members of the EC have accustomed
themselves quickly to the EPC process in New York. Both
states orientated themselves very closely to the EPC pro-
cess even before 1985. Both have sought EC membership for a
long period, and in order to achieve positions in accord
with its partners, they began aligning their views to those
of the members to minimize opposition to their accession.
This was specially true for Portugal which underlined its
pro-European position by casting only eleven minority votes
m the 40th G.A. Because of Portugal’s and Spain’s special
relations to former colonies in Africa, in Central and South
America, the two new members see themselves as a connecting
link between the EC and these states. The establishment of
consultations with the Contadora Group in 1984 and 1985 is
an example of greater European sensitivities to Latin Ameri-
can problems, promoted by Spain and Portugal.
Portugese diplomats emphasized that the position of
their country was largely improved at the United Nations by
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joining the EC. They expected to bring "a greater sensitivi-
ty to the other member states for the promotion and fo-
stering of the co-operation with Africa and Latin
America"
. On Middle Eastern issues the positions of Portu-
gal and Spain were more radical than most of its other EC
states; towards South Africa, on the other hand, Portugal
sided often with the United Kingdom and the Federal
Republic
.
2
1
Spain has a larger number of special interests,
part iculary in the Mediterranean and in South America than
Portugal, where Spain dissented often from the EC
mainstream. In Middle Eastern issues Spain cast, together
with Greece seven two-minority votes on the "Question of
Palestine
.
22 On Middle East issues Spain pursued, together
with Greece, the most radical or "pro-arab" position. 22 Its
dissent from its partners emerges also in disarmament and
human right questions. Here it dissents, however, less often
than Greece or Ireland, and about as much as Denmark. Spain
can described as a "hardliner" in many issues compared with
the majority of its European counterparts.
Both Spain and Portugal are regarded as more open to
common European positions and are showing a much more pro-
European Community attitude than Greece. Both are "shoved
together" 2 4 a s a European diplomat described it, because of
their common European positions and because of their relati-
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vely new membership; a further adoption of common European
positions is expected rather than an increase of minorrty
positions
.
Greece describes its position in the EPC as that of a
" progressive force”. It Joins the EC in many actions and ma-
kes joint efforts to reach a consensus, and also ’’makes sa-
crifices for common European positions”
.
2 5 Many European di-
plomats characterize Greece, however, as a ’’trouble
maker .26 It is the most complicated EPC member, which dis-
sented in fifty-four cases from its European partners in
1985 alone. Since its accession to the EC in 1981 it has
cast 134 single minority votes, a number nearly four times
as high as the thirty-five one-minority votes of all eleven
other member states combined. Though the number of Greek
one-minority votes declined from thirty-eight in 1984 to ni-
ne in 1985, the overall high number of dissenting votes re-
mained relatively stable at fifty-four per session. In all
G.A. committees Greece is the top "dissident”; the most com-
mon positions with its EC partners can be found on economic
issues. Especially in disarmament and security matters, the
Middle East and South Africa, Greece has the greatest dis-
senting position in the EC. In human rights issues, Greek
diplomats described their positions as more "radical" than
other Member States. ” By analyzing the divided votes in the
40th G.A., tabled according to Committees in Table V and
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combined with Appendix I, the following oan fae obseryed;
Greece dissented on all three resolutions adopted by vote on
eport of the 6th (legal affairs) committee and on all
eleven such resolutions in the Special Political Committee.
It also dissented in many cases in the other committees.
This relatively high level of Greek dissent stems from
pecularities of Greek domestic politics. In most of the Eu-
ropean states an all-party consensus about the national po-
licy in the European community has been established. In
Greece the pro-European policy of the conservative govern-
ment which brought the country into the EC was not continued
after the anti-European socialist party gained power in
1981. This caused a "dramatic change" 2 » in the policy of
Greece in the European context as well as in disarmament and
human right questions. While the Greek position shifted to a
more European line in issues of minor importance during the
1980
’ s , it remained more radical than its European partners
in more controversial fields. Five years after the accession
of Greece, its position is largely unchanged. The fact that
Greece in controversial issues, such as the Middle East, was
willing to underwrite the common fundamental statements and
the overall political positions of the EPC with its wide
range of issues, can, however, be characterized as progress.
Dissenting opinions are in such cases often explained in a
separate explanation of vote” by Greece. The decrease of
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one-minority votes in 1985 compared with previous sessions
signaled a higher sensitivity of Greece to avoxd isolation.
The permanent pressure by other member states in order to
achieve common positions seemed to show success.
The fact that Spain and Ireland were very reluctant to
cast minority votes in cases where they would have been iso-
lated influenced Greece to a much lesser degree, as its high
number of one-minority votes in the 1980>s indicates. On the
other hand these states were more willing to join Greece or
an other state in a minority vote.
The enlargement of the EC by Greece in 1981 and the fol-
lowing Greek voting behavior had a large negative impact on
the establishment of common positions in the G.A.. The un-
wi 1 1 igness of Greece to join its European partners on many
issues became obvious in the high number of resolutions whe-
re Greece was isolated. The regular dissent of one Member
State led also to a greater reluctance of other member
states to make compromises. All this produced a sharp
decline of common European voting patterns at the begining
of the 1980’s, which only slightly improved at the 40th G . A
.
in 1985. The accession of Spain and Portugal restrained
further the common decision process, but, differing from the
Greek position, both states were more willing to adopt Euro-
pean positions. The majority of the Member States preserved
and even increased their common policies in the 1980’s; this
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was, however, over shadowed by the
pattern of Greece.
desintegrating voting
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TABLE V
EC VOTES IN THE 40TH GENERAL ASSPMRl
V
Votes by the
_
Twelve in the G. A. Plenarv nn r-oo ^ l , , ^ 4 ,
separate amendments and paragraphes
M. * * t
r) H n n I- ^H T.r i 4-
U
or without a report by a Main Comm iff ^ <=>
CONSENSUS CV * DV * TOTAL
Plenary 14 21 29 64
1st COMMITTEE 21 17 40 78
SP COMMITTEE 6 14 1 1 31
2nd COMMITTEE 59 7 7 73
3rd COMMITTEE 59 14 12 85
4th COMMITTEE 1
1
- 4 15
5th COMMITTEE 15 8 8 31
6th COMMITTEE 12 - 3 15
TOTAL 197 81 114 392
TOTAL CV + DV 195 41 . 5% 58.5%
Common Votes ( CV
)
and Divided Votes ( DV ) of the EPC
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TABLE VI
MINORITY VOTES IN THE EC TN THE 40TH GENERAL ASSFMRi.v
Number of minority votes by EC M<pmhpr ^
40th G.A. (excluding ,«ay soli
o ± l 1
ts ) 2 9
tne
TOTALminority OF
1 2 3 4 5
Belgium 0 0 1 0 0 1
Denmark 0 1 5 9 2 17
F .R. of Germany 0 1 3 2 1 7
Greece 9 17 15 10 3 54
Franee 4 3 4 4 OkJ 18
I reland 0 rr( 7 9 4 27
Italy 0 0 0 2 3 5
Luxemburg 0 0 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 0 0 2 2 1 5
United Kingdom 1 3 4 2 1 1 1
Portugal 0 0 6 2 3 l 1
Spain 1 12 10 10 4 37
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TABLE VII
COMPARISON OF EC MINORITY VOTES 1981-1985
Number of minority
36 th- 4 0 t.h a . a
votes by EC Member States from thp
J_excluding three-way splits) 3 0
of one
MINORITIES
of two of three of four of five
1381 1982 1983 1984 1985 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1981 1982 1983 19S4 1985 1985
Bjiuiiun 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 6 5 ti 0 0
DENMARK 1 I) 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 3 7 17 10 5 4 4 7 6 c u
F.R. OF GERMANY 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 5 2 1 3 2 4 4 3 5 5 9 5
n
L 1
GREECE 28 26 33 38 9 9 14 9 13 17 5 10 17 11 15 3 4 5 L 10 3
FRANCE 2 2 2 4 4 5 6 4 5 3 4 3 4 4 4 4 6 7 4 4 00
IRELAND 1 1 0 1 0 6 11 7 12 7 6 9 17 9 7 3 3 5 3 9
.
4
ITALY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 4 4 6
0
u
- y)
LUXEMBURG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 5 4 1 0 0
NETHERLANDS 0 0 0 0 0 I 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 2 2 3 6 3 3
0
L 1
UNITED EINGDOM 3 2 4 5 1 5 7 8 6 3 2 2 6 5 4 6 9 9 5 £ 1
PORTUGAL 0 0 6 L
0
SPAIN
1 12 10 10 4
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B. PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP OF FRANCE
AND UNITED KINGDOM
The special positions of France and the United Kingdom in
the U.N. organization causes them to pursue certain special
interests not shared by their European partners. This is
especially the case in security matters since both states
are interested in keeping questions involving nuclear wea-
pons as well as all issues discussed in the Security
Council, out of EPC consultations at the U.N. Consultations
with the United States and other non-permanent Western mem-
bers take priority at the Security Council. Official consul-
tations on its agenda do not take place in the EPC context;
Security Council matters are discussed with the EPC partners
on a strictly informal basis. France and the United Kingdom
are very fearful that their historically based special
status in the Security Council might be challenged if they
are commonly acting with their European partners in security
matters
.
Since security matters normally fall outside of the sco-
pe of the EC treaties there is no conflict within the Euro-
pean Communities on these issues. 3i where legally binding
instruments are involved, however, such as in as the pre-
paration of conventions on topics within Community
competence, the usual EC rules apply", according to Michael
88
Hardy
.
3 2
Even if no official consultations take place on Security
Council matters
,
most of these issues are regulary discussed
in the EPC context at the directoral or ministerial levels.
On such matters as the Middle East or South Africa, common
positions have already been taken; these are reflected by
the positions individual European Member States take in the
Security Council. When Italy and the Federal Republic join
the Security Council for 1987/88, there should be increased
consultation on security matters expected in the EPC
context, despite the fact of French and British disapproval.
The different political status of individual EC members at
the United Nations will nevertheless remain a handicap for
further increasing co-operation in New York.
C. SUBSTANTIVE RESULTS IN MAJOR POLITICAL FIELDS
L.N. diplomacy is based on the construction of alliances
between groups for achieving a majority and therefore makes
the co-operation of the Twelve an important factor for
success. If the EC is not united on an important issue the
chances of acceptance of Western European views is reduced,
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and the individual States are usually left without an ef-
fective means of proceeding. For individual Member States it
became more difficult to succeed with an initiative without
the support of its partners. other groups expect that the
Europeans will act together. When an individual member laun-
ches a proposal without backing of the EPC this decreases
strongly the chances of success. =3 The EC framework provides
a basis for cohesion and it proves to be effective for the
advancement of common and individual interests. 3 . The EPC
also offers for individual members the possibility of hiding
behind common positions. Individual Member States can easier
rebut domestic and foreign critics by citing the pressure of
partners and the necessity of making compromises for accom-
plishing common European positions. This was shown for exam-
ple in the case of South Africa, which will be discussed
below
.
By analyzing the divided votes of the Twelve at the 40th
G ' A
•
ln Table V, and Appendix I and II, it can be
that in 195 votes the Twelve were divided 114 times
can be found in the following areas for 1985:
Disarmament: 40 of 57 votes;
Middle East: 18 of 38 votes;
South Africa and Namibia: 10 of 22 votes;
Human rights: 12 of 26 votes;
Budget questions: 8 of 16 votes;
Economic issues: 7 of 14 votes;
Decolonization: 7 of 7 votes;
Legal questions: 3 of 3 votes;
Falkland: 3 of 3 votes;
Mayotte: 1 of 1 vote;
Law of Sea: 1 of 1 vote;
t
obse rved
.
Sp 1 i ts
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The areas with the highest disagreed are mostly those is-
sues concerning disarmament questions, l egal and
decolonization issues. Lack of conformity and common positi-
are balanced in the remaining fields by excluding the
single issue resolutions on the Falklands, Mayotte or the
Law of the Sea. By excluding Greece, Spain and Portugal from
the dividing voting pattern, as is done in Table III, the
number of divided votes is reduced to eighty-eight. The ex-
clusion of the two states with the highest minority votes
naturally affects the different issues. And if Ireland, as
the third "hardliner" in the EC, would also be excluded in
the analysis, the number of divided votes would decrease
further. In disarmament questions, and South Africa and
Middle East issues, a larger number of common positions bet-
ween the remaining nine members can be noticed. Greece and
Ireland cast the only dissenting votes in eleven of the for-
ty disarmament resolutions.
Using as a criterion the votes on issues of particular
importance, it can be measured with some accuracy the level
of co-operation between the EC Member States in the G.A. It
must be noted, though, that in some cases the resulting re-
solutions were adopted by consensus. Some of these issues
with top-priority for the West, for example
,
the resolutions
on terrorism and hos tage-taking or drug abuses, were adopted
by consensus in the 40th G.A. plenary. On December 9th, the
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a resolution in which it
Assembly adopted by consensus
"unequivocally condemns, as criminal, all acts, methods and
practices of terrorism, wherever and by whomever committed,
including those which jeopardize friendly relations among
states and their security". is This was the first time that
the entire membership unanimously condemned terrorism. Also
for the first time, the G.A. drew a clear distinction bet-
ween terrorists and freedom fighters of whatever stripe. The
resolution summoned the world community to action against
terrorism by national measures and through the U.N.
specialized agencies. Similiar action is being prepared
against the international narcotics traffic. Four resoluti-
ons on drug abuse and drug trafficking were adopted
unanimously, by consensus, during the 40th G.A. One of these
dealt with the preparation of a new Convention against Drug
Trafficking. The other concerned the international conferen-
ce on drugs to be held in mid-1987.36 Similiary, the special
session of the G.A. in April 1986 on the critical economic
situation in Africa adopted its resolutions also by
consensus. Thus some important resolutions were adopted in
the 40th G.A. by consensus.
To observe the European co-operation at the General As-
sembly closer I will focuse on five conflicts in five
different regions, which were main issues in the 40th as
well as preceding G.A. sessions. The resolutions I have cho-
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sen deal with the occupation of Afghanistan and Cambodia by
the Soviet Union and Vietnam respectively; the situation in
Central and South America, focusing on human right abuses,
and the conflict between the U.S. and Nicaragua; the situa-
tion in South Africa and Namibia, and the Middle East, con-
centrating on the Israel - Palestine conflict. All five is-
sues are discussed in the EPC context and are also characte-
rized by differing degrees of agreement between the Member
States
.
1. Afghanis tan and Cambodia
In an initial resolution of November 14, 1979 under the text
heading The Situation in Cambodia" ninety-one countries
demanded the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from
Cambodia. On November 20, 1980, the G
. A
. adopted, with the
support of 110 countries, a resolution putting forward the
same demand in respect of Afghanistan. This marked for the
first time 'a reversal of the West, East and South bloc po-
sitions that had almost been taken for granted over a goodly
numbers of years", wrote Heinrich Bechthold, a German poli-
tical scientist. 37 During the 40th session, the General As-
sembly adopted similar resolutions on these subjects with a
larger majority than before, and criticized for the first
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time human right abuses in Afghanistan.
On November 13, 1985 th P pa j j ,
’ e G ' A ' demanded, by a vote of
122 to nineteen, with twelve abstentions (1984: 119 - 20 - 14 )
the "immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from
Afghanistan". Reaffirming "the right of the Afghan people to
determine their own form of government", the U.M. called
upon all parties "to work for the urgent achievement of a
political solution" to the conflict. »• The Europeans states
declared in a joint statement at the G.A. that only a "true
political solution allows Afghanistan to resume its status
as an independent, non-aligned country and the Afghan people
to exercise their right to self-determination" . a
,
On December 13, 1985, the G.A. adopted, with eighty vo-
tes against twenty-two and forty abstentions, for the first
time a resolution titled "Question of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms in Afghanistan", in which the U.N. expres-
sed its "profound distress and alarm ... at the widespread
violataions of the right to life, liberty and security of
person, including the commonplace practice of torture and
summary executions of the opponents of the regime" in
Afghanistan. 4 o The revised draft of that resolution was
sponsored by all EPC states as well as several neutral West-
ern and Third World countries. On November 5, 1985 the G.A.
adopted by a vote of 1 14 ( yes ) -2 1 ( no )- 16 ( abstention ) (1984:
1 10 — 22—18 ), a resolution on the 'Situation in Kampuchea
"
,
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demanding the withdrawal of all foreign forces f rom
Cambodia, and the restroation and preservation of its
independence, sovereignty and territorial integraty". .1
In a statement on January 23, 1985 the European Council
reaffirmed its position on Cambodia and condemned "the seri-
ous violations of human rights and of the basic principles
of the UN charter by the Vietnamese troops and called for
the "withdrawal of all foreign troops from Cambodia and the
restoration of the i. u _rignt ot the Khmer people to self-
determination"
.
4 2
Besides the fact that the Twelve agreed among themselves
in both issues, the resolutions on Cambodia and Afghanistan
one of the few political issues at the General Assembly
where total agreement and joint positions exist between the
EC and the United States as well. The G . A . demanded, by re-
cord majorities, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afgha-
nistan and Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. In votes culmi-
nating from previous work in the Human Righs Commission, the
40th G . A
.
passed for the first time, with the support of
countries from all regional groups, resolutions which criti-
cized human right abuses in Afghanistan, as well as in
Iran. 43 The adoption of these two resolutions can be
described as an important change compared to previous years.
Often political considerations have blocked impartial exami-
nation of human rights violations, with Western nations
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charging that a double
allies to criticism while
the Eastern bloc. In 1985
standard subjected the
shielding those in, or
such a double standard
m and their
close to
was eroded.
—
—South Africa and Namibia
The issue of Apartheid and the question of Namibia have been
one of the main issues at the General Assembly for many
years. Here the western states often face harsh criticism by
African states because of their economic relations with
South Africa and their reluctance to impose sanctions. The
Europeans explained their joint positions with common
declarations, and voted together in twelve of the twenty-two
resolutions . 4 4 In the remaining ten votes the EPC members
split their votes. The European states, together with the
United States, took joint positions on the resolutions on
Namibia. There they voted mostly in common, and succeeded in
voting down all six cases were the U.S. was accused by name.
The co-operation between the United Kingdom, France, the
Federal Republic, Canada and the United States in the Na-
mibia Group is also a noteworthy feature on that issue,
which sometimes shifted the attention of its European mem-
bers away from the EPC process to a closer co-operation with
the U.S. The split in the European states occurred between
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the m ° re radlCal States as Greece, Ireland and Spain,
joined in several cases by Denmark and the Netherlands and
the more moderate states such as the Federal Republic and
the United Kingdom. The Europeans were in most of the reso-
lutions in a minority position facing the united majority of
Third World countries and the Eastern bloc.
The main part of the resolutions on South Africa were
incorporated in Resolution 40/64 which was divided in se-
parate parts. The European states' common statements criti-
cized without reservation the system of apartheid, and re-
jected the calling of economic sanctions against South
Africa. The delegate of Luxemburg declared on behalf of the
Twelve, that "only a political, peaceful solution will make
it possible to create a climate of stability". He added,
that the EC "cannot support the calls for the breaking ’off
all relations with South-Af rica
, because isolating it would
be contrary to the goal". 46 Moreover, the EPC criticized the
singling out of Israel in one resolution, where Israel was
asked "to desist from and terminate all forms of collabora-
tion with South Africa". 47 The EPC also criticized in its
common declaration that some "of the wording
. .
.
gives an
incorrect picture of our common positions and rejected all
arbitrary and unjustified attacks, whether by name or impli-
citly on Member States or groups of countries". 49 All twelve
European states abstained on the "International Convention
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against Apartheid in Sports"-. On a resolution demanding
"Sanctions against the Racist Regime of South Africa", s.
European states voted against, while Greece
abstained. In all other six resolutions the Europeans were
divided and several Member States stated their positions be-
sides the common EPC declaration in separate
"explanations
of vote". Only one resolution, about the "U.N. Trust Fund
for South Africa" was adopted by the G
. A
. through
consensus. This resolution was also co-sponsered by seven EC
states . 52 In most cases the European states were in the mi-
nority whereby dissenting Member states, such as Greece,
Ireland or Denmark, supported some drafts but criticized the
language of resolutions. This led other European states,
such as the United Kingdom or the Federal Republic, to vote
against that specific text, while the majority of Europeans
mostly abstained or joined the "hardliners”. This occurred,
for example, in a resolution asking for "Concerted Interna-
tional Action for the Elimination of Apartheid" 5
3
f which was
also co-sponsered by Greece, Denmark and Ireland. Here the
majority voted in favor while the Federal Republic
abstained, and the United Kingdom voted against it. 54 This
was also the only resolution where a EC majority joined the
Third World majority in voting. In all other cases the majo-
rity of the European states found themselves in the
majority. The European states were also split on the resolu-
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tion about the "Situation in South Africa and Assistance to
Liberation Movements " s s . while Greece joined the Third World
majority, and Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain
abstained, the remaining states opposed that resolution.
Ireland declared in its explanation of vote that it "would
have wished to vote in favor", but it could not "accept the
explicit endorsment of the armed struggle" in this
resolution
. The delegate of the Netherlands rejected
charcterizing the African National Congress and the Pan Af-
ricanist Congress as liberation movements, rather than anti-
apartheid movements, and could not subscribe to the general
thrust of the resolution, which postulated "the existence of
a colonial situation in South Africa". 57 In general the Eu-
ropeans as well as the United States have common positions
on the situation in South Africa. They are, however, strong-
ly criticized by Third World countries. European diplomats
stated, that they differ more in tactics rather than in the
aim, the abolishment of apartheid". They described the posi-
tion of the United Nations on South Africa as "too
extreme". ** Some European states, such as Spain or France,
supported in several cases the demand for sanctions, other
Europeans joined, on the other hand, the more reluctant po-
sition of the U.S. The positions for the Europeans were
mostly stated in common declarations expressing their high
agreement on fundamental issues. Especially Greece, but also
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Ireland, however, left in several cases the European consen-
sus to pursue a more radical position by joining the Third
World majority. The West was only able to achieve a majority
for its positions, when it challenged seven invidious refe-
rences in draft resolutions on Namibia
, criticizing the
U.S. by name. In these cases it obtained the necessary broad
support to have the relevant phrases and paragraphs deleted.
More important than the immediate issue was the willingness
of Third World countries to vote with the West in those
highly political matters, which indicated that the Western
states are not totally isolated on that issue in the G.A.
The importance of an integration-pressure could be seen
in the development of the European position towards South
Africa in 1986 when the United Kingdom and the Federal Repu-
blic agreed after increasing pressure of its partners on
economic sanctions against South Africa. Both could justify
their decision towards domestic criticism by the necessity
of agreeing on a common European position. The pressures put;
upon the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic by the ma-
jority of the EC states offered thereby for both "a way out
of their disastrous situation”, stated a diplomat of one of
these countries
.
5 9 This resulted in limited sanctions on
South Africa which were imposed in September 1986
.
60 This
could make it for the Europeans "a little easier for dealing
with the Africans”, in future G.A, stated several
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diplomats
.
6
1
3. Latin America
During the 40th G.A. four resolutions on Central and South
America were adopted; only one addressed the political si-
tuation in Central America, while the others dealt with hu-
man right questions in Chile, El Salvador and Guatamala. A
complex discussion took place concerning the report by the
U.N. General Secretary on "The Situation in Central America:
Threats to International Peace and Security".
e
2 Only one re-
solution was adopted on the trade embargo imposed by the
U.S. on Nicaragua. The Europeans have increased their invol-
vement and are "newly interested"”, as an American diplomat
stated, in Central and South American issues. This is large-
ly due to the fact that Spain is now working to increase its
European partners’ understanding of Latin Americans’ views
and needs. The greater European activity in Central America
was seen in two meetings between Foreign Ministers of the
twelve European states and the representatives of Latin Ame-
rican states, including all members of the "Contadora Group"
on September 28-29, 1984. It laid the basis (by means of po-
litical dialogue and economic co-operation) of a new struc-
ture of relations between the EC and Central America. This
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meeting was followed up by a seoonr) „ rp cond conference
H-12, 1985 in Luxemburg where an agreement on interregional
co-operation was signed, and where the EC states also rene-
heir support for the Contadora peace effort. «» The
delegate of Luxemburg declared on behalf of its European
partners at the G. A., that the Europeans "remain convinced
that the crisis in Central America cannot be successfully
solved by resorting to force but solely by an amicable
settlement". Moreover, he explained that "the absence of any
resort to the threat or use of force and
... non-
intervention by any foreign forces into the region" should
be necessary. aa When the G . A . "regretted" the U.S. trade em-
bargo imposed against Nicaragua and "requested that those
measures be immediately revoked"., none of its European all-
ies supported the U.S. Four of them - Denmark, France,
Greece and Spain - even voted in favor of this resolution.
The European states doubt, in general, the usefulness of em-
bargos and share a common process towards the peace process
in Central America. The different voting behavior of the EC
Member States can therefore be related less to policy
differences over Central America, than to the different
degree of willigness to criticize the United States on
behalf of each European state.
The Europeans also achieved agreement on the three reso-
lutions on human right issues in Latin America. The resol u-
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tion on the "Situation of Human Rights and fundamental Free-
Guatemala urged the government of Guatemala to
halt violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms". The resolution on El Salvador requested "all
States to refrain from intervening in the internal situation
El Salvador
,
and asked the government "to continue and
strengthen the process of reform". «» The Europeans asserted
in them joint statement that progress towards democracy in
both countries was made, but they asked both states to avoid
further abuses of human rights. They urged, for example, the
government of El Salvador "to keep the Government apparatus
and the army under control".*. In both cases, all European
states voted in favor of the resolutions, while the U.S.
abstained, criticizing the text as "unbalanced", by not men-
tioning the "responsibility of the Marxist rebels or of ex-
tremist groups' for the violence in the country. 7 o
The European states agreed also in their votes on a si-
milar resolution on human rights abuses in Chile, which
demanded from the "Chilean authorities to restore and re-
spect human rights ...(and) to put an end to the regime of
exception
.
71 The Luxemburg delegate stated, on behalf of
the EPC, that "the general process of democratization in the
region had not yet reached Chile" and he further criticized
the serious and systematic human right violations ". 72 The
draft resolution was adopted with the votes of all European
1 03
states, while thp it je U.S. voted against the resolution critici-
zing again that "the draft t ,resolution was still not a
balanced one"
.
7 3
Concerning Central America the Europeans and the U.S.
have "definitely two different points of view" as an Ameri-
can diplomat explained
. The differences between the EC and
the U.S. consist in the assertion of human right abuses in
states, and in the situation of Nicaragua. Some Eu-
ropeans states, such as the Federal Republic and the United
Kingdom, are, however, more reluctant to criticize the U.S.
directly and try to avoid controversies with the U.S.
others, such as France, Denmark or Spain, are less bound by
the opinion of the U.S.
i-i Israel-Palesti ne Conflict
The Twelve
eight votes
votes dealt
their posit
differed in
twenty-four
European par
achieved a consensus on twenty of the thirty-
taken on Middle East issues. Nearly all of these
with the Israel
-Pales tine conflict. Concerning
ions on Middle East resolutions, the Europeans
most cases with the U.S. The high number of
votes, where the U.S. was opposed by all of its
tners is remarkable. The depth of U.S. isolation
on Middle East issues is shown by the fact that
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in the G . A
.
cast along with Israel
in fifteen of these cases the U.S.
the only "no” vote in the G.A.’s
Since the 1970’s the Europeans have built up an
independent Middle East policy and come to differ more and
m° re fr°m the U ' S
' position
. With the accession of Greece,
Spain and Portugal, the previously isolated French and Ita-
lian desire for an independent European Middle East policy,
less orientated on that of the U.S.
, received more support
in the EC. This shift led through adoption of the Venice
declaration to a balanced independent European view of the
Israel - Palestine conflict. In a common declaration of
the EPC at the G.A., the delegate of Luxemburg explained
that the European position for a settlement of the Arab-
Israeli conflict should be "based on Security Council Reso-
lution 242(1967) and 338(1973) and should include the rights
to existence and security of all the States including
Israel,
... (and) the right of the Palestinian people to
self-determination. The PLO must take part in the
negotiations
... (and) the principles of the non-use of for-
ce and the non-acquisition of territories by force must be
respected and the territorial occupation which Israel had
maintained since 1967 must be ended". 77
The EPC mainstream states are mostly united on the Arab
Israeli conflict issue. But Greece, Spain and Portugal
pursue a more radical policy. Thia can be seen in the fact
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that they cast Twelve of the eighteen minority votes on that
issue. The differences between the EPC majority and minority
occurs in all aspects of that conflict: humanitarian issues,
issues, concerning the occuppied territories, and issues
arising from political proposals. In humanitarian and econo-
mic issues, the resolutions concerned aid to Palestinians,
as for example the resolutions about "Assistance to the
Palestinian People"
.
7 9 thp "1 , . .F ’ zne Living conditions of the
Palestine people in occuppied territories ”. 7 9 i n different
resolutions on "Assistance to Palestine Refugees", •» measu-
res for the assistance of the United Nations Relief and
orks Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)
were adopted. Mainly political resolutions, for example,
four on the "Question of Palestine”, which asked also for
the convening of an international peace conference on the
Middle East 81
,
on which the twelve Europeans abstained. The
three resolutions on the "Situation in the Middle East"
declared "Israel’s decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction
and administration on the occupied Syrian Golan Heights
illegal and ... null and void". They also criticized a
negative U.S. vote on the same subject in the Security
Council. 82 In that case the European states, with the excep-
tion of Spain and Greece, joined the U.S. in their negative
vote. Greece declared in a separate explanation of vote to
"separate votes had been
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that resolution that if taken
...(it) would have abstained” . • a The Europeans joined the
U.S. m all cases where name-calling occurred in a common
effort to delete those pasages from drafts. Another bloc of
resolutions dealt with the "Territories occupied by
Israel" 84
' The European states voted for example in favor of
Resolution 40/161C, which was critical of Israeli
"settlements in the Palestinian and other occupied
territories". In a resolution criticizing the "Violation of
human rights of the civialian population of the territories
occupied by Israel
,
85 most of the Europeans also abstained.
On Middle East issues, the Europeans have achieved a
high number of common votes and common declarations, while
the dissenting votes were cast mainly by Greece or Spain.
The European states are here not as much isolated as on
South African issues and join the Third World majority
especially on humanitarian questions. The policy of the EC
shifted through the influence of the mainly "pro-arab" posi-
tions of Greece, France and Italy, to a more balanced policy
m the 1980’s. Arab pressure, but also the desire of the Eu-
ropeans to pursue an independent Middle East policy from the
U.S., led to the adoption of the minority position by the EC
majority. Through the accession of Spain and Portugal an
even stronger manifestation of European positions on the
Middle East conflict can be expected. During the 1980’s,
shifts in the Arab positions affected the Europeans as well.
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The unity of Arab views increased and decreased during that
time, marked for example by the Arab disarray in the after-
math of the Camp David treaty, or different conflicts bet-
ween the PLO and Jordan or Syria. Thus, confronted with a
less united Arab positions, the Europeans were sometimes mo-
re able to influence the decision making process at the G.A.
The U.S. and Israel are, on the other hand, very isola-
ted on Middle East issues in the General Assembly.
E. SUMMARY
Several reasons for agreeing or not agreeing on common posi-
tions between the twelve Member States of the EC could be
observed
.
They consist, first, on the fact that if a member
belongs to a "contact group", as for example the Namibia
Group or the Nordic Group, it often sticks to this contact
group position if that conflicts with the one of the EC.
Second, if a member has strong ties to some outside
group of states, as is the case with Spain towards Latin
America or Greece towards Arab states, and their position
<^^^'^ers from the EC position, the respective member goes in
108
many oases with this outsider group.
Third, if a member has develQped a distinct approach ^
issue, either before or after the EPC was formed or that
particular member has joined the Fr • - uJ Q zn hC
> as m the case of the
British or French disarmament policy the • uuxx , Spanish South
American" policy and the Greek "Middle East" policy, it is
more reluctant to give up that position.
Fourth, if a member wants to prove certain ideological
credentials that lead to positions different from the rest,
as is the case, for example, for Denmark and the Netherlands
on human rights or economic questions, or for Ireland and
Greece on disarmament issues, that member will also dissent
from the EC position.
In the decision-making process of the EPC, the national
policies of Member States moved away from dissent towards
the group consensus. This, however, depend also on the dome-
stic situation in each country. The cases where dissent
ended occurred in mainly two different approaches, although,
with man} varieties: on certain issues, .as in the Middle
East, the group adopted or became closer to an originally
minority view as the common position. In other cases, as on
economic questions, the minority adopted after a .process of
accommodation the position of the majority.
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CONCLUS ION
THE EPC at THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY in THE 1,980 >S;
AN ASSESSMENT
The European Community has gone a iong way toward integrati-
on but it is still not a federal structure, let alone a
single political and economic entity. Yet, the Co-operation
of the Member States within the framework of the European
Political Co-operation has enabled the Twelve to speak on
more foreign policy issues with "one voice". The EPC also
provides a classic example of success in achieving common
positions and in implementing common actions, which
increases the desire of the participants for further co-
operation. The team work at the General Assembly has shown
that the more the Europeans act as a group the more they are
accepted as an international partner for dialogue, and as a
major political factor at the United Nations. The G.A. is
one of the most important forums for the permanent practice
of the EPC. The examples of EPC initiatives clearly demon-
strate the will and ability of the Member States to play a
more cohesive European role based on their own preconditions
and their possibilities of taking action. The Twelve are now
generally acknowledged by Third World countries as a politi-
in the General Assembly.
1 17
tical bloc on most issues
The direct and permanent co-operation of ali partici-
pants of the national decision making process in the EPC co-
ordination has mobilised in the foreign ministries a large
of professional skill, political knowlegde and
special experiences for the European co-operation. Personal
relations, a detailed knowledge of the co-ordination
process, and confident talks have established a firm founda-
tion for the multilateral decision-making process in the
EPC. Based on that "esprit de corps" a European "Zeitgeist"
was established, enabling the partners to create highly fle-
xible co-operation mechanisms and thereby facilitate the
adaptation to political circumstances.
number of consultations and of issues considered has
increased over the years on all levels of the EPC. The aug-
menting number of consultations has, however, shown the in-
ternal limits of co-operation. The principle of consensus
expects unanimity of all Member States on basic questions of
cign policy, and this can collide with domestic politics
and national interests. Despite the fact that the European
states have reached consensus on all major issues at the Ge-
neral Assembly, which resulted in a high number of common
declarations, these statements often reflect agreement on
fundamental positions. Dissenting positions of individual
Member States on certain aspects of that issue were reflec-
ted in national "explanations of vote”, or other forms of
declarations
.
Different voting pattern occured desnitP + up e these commmon
fundamental positions, because of different judgments either
on draft resolutions, the political
- pathological import-
ance of resolutions or as a consequence of special tactical
national manoeuvers. The desire to display national
profiles, as well as the pursuance of special political and
economic interests towards the Third World, are in many ca-
stronger than the permanent pressure inside the EPC for
achieving common European positions.
The differences in circumstances between Member States;
varying in their governments and political tendencies, size
and economic situations, remained an important negative fac-
tor in achieving common positions in the EPC context.
The EPC at the General Assembly has reached its limits
under contemporary conditions; the co-ordination process has
risen to a degree which does not offer many possibilities
for further technical improvements. The Twelve are now
locked in the present status of integration they have
achieved. The same differences emerge again and again as
long as they are not discussed and solved on higher levels
in Europe.
Moreover, the enlargement of the EPC has increased the
difficulties for consensus positions. As Stanley Hoffmann
"the price of broader membership is a far more cori-
1 19
s tates
,
tent lous process of decision, and harder bargaining among
divergent interests rather than upgrading the common
interest"
. The accession of Greece in 1981 proved to be a
handicap for an expansion of common positions, as reflected
in the declining number of common votes in the 1980’s. Greek
disagreement with the rest of its partners on several main
issues has created a disintegrating tendency, and has led to
^ of common voting DRt t prnc rpi ^ • . .* pa e s. The dissention of Greece
made it easier for others to break out of the European
mainstream, and join Greece in its minority position.
The participation of Portugal and Spain in the 40th Ge-
neral Assembly, however, did not lead to an increasing
disintegration as one might expect from their greater sympa-
thy towards Third World positions. Both states were integra-
ted without much complications in the EPC process, and adop-
ted in many fields the already established European
positions. How and if this will have a reverse influence on
the disintegrating influence of Greece has to be seen in fu-
ture G
. A
. sessions. The first positive change in Greece’s
policy can be seen in the decline of isolated votes at the
40th G
. A
.
The establishment of a EPC Secretariat in Brussels na-
turally will influence the co-operation in New York, which
under present conditions has reached its technical limits.
The EPC Secretariat will offer more coherence, though no im-
120
mediate changes can be expected T t c 4- ^ •. I s establishment will
increase the coherence of the EPC process and could so serve
as an additional integrative supportive factor for the EPC.
The pressure for integration is not yet strong enough to
lead to agreed positions throughout and the submission of an
array of distinctive EC proposals at the General Assembly.
The scope of what has been achieved so far is, however, not
to be underestimated. It is no longer possible for an
individual Member State to hope to succeed with an initiati-
without the help Of its partners, or indeed even to con-
launching a proposal without recourse to common
mechan i sms
.
From the political scientists’ viewpoint the EPC is in-
teresting because the co-operation represents a unique con-
nection of different organizational principles. For the stu-
dy of international organizations the EPC offers a material
that can give important impetus for critical discussion of
^ ^ ^ f unc t i o n s. 1 i sm thco r v 4-
u
Lne y
,
and future theory construction in
the field of integration-research.
The building of the European Community confirmed, up un-
til the mid- 1960’s, the position of neo-functionalism which
expected that a political integration would follow the func-
tional co-operation as a "by-product”. From the late 1960's
the theoretical criticism of neo-functionalism increased in
the light of a stagnation of the European integration
121
process. On the other handn nu.
, intergovernnipnta la vex ome l co-operation
became during the 1970-3 mote and more important, as can he
increasing importance of the summit diplomacy by
the European Council and in the form of the European Politi-
cal Co-operation. The EPC combines the functional multilate-
ral EC organization with the intergovernmental co-operation
the twelve national foreign ministries. By acting in the
forum of the United Nations, the EPC offer*> n tt s a connection
between the U.N. and thp* tjc . . u
, which enables a harmonization
Of both, mostly on the basis of the organizational principle
of the EPC, effectuated preliminarily through the permanent
missions
. Thus the EC receives through the EPC a broader
showcase for proving the possibilities of the European m-
tegration process.
The relations between the twelve European states and the
United States at the General Assembly in the 1980’s were
complicated by the controversial and aggressive policy of
the U
. S
. , under Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, toward the
Third World. Though both partners are in a minority position
at the U.N.
,
the Europeans were more able to deal with de-
veloping countries, while the U.S. often attracted hostility
at the General Assembly.
The overall isolation of the U.S. led to a political re-
valorization of the EC group at the General Assembly. The
Europeans acted increasingly as a unit in the diplomatic
1 22
arena of the U.N. Thu«
’ they were enabled to take over the
Western leadership role uhi„uP , which was given up by the U.S., i n
the dialogue with the Third World.
In the long run
, however, a disappointed a„d
America, which prepared to retreat from the United Nations,
would weaken decisively the position of the Twelve. Europe
can, in the long-term, only gain in influence and weight
when the position of the West as a whole - with the
inclusion of the U.S. - can be strengthened toward the Ea-
stern Bloc and the Third World at the General Assembly. The
change-over in the U.S. mission at the U . N
. , fromJeaneJ.
Kirkpatrick to Vernon A. Walters as U.S. ambassador, altered
the style of the U.S. policy, which was reflected also in an
improvement in the climate between the western partners.
The success of the EPC is impressive, the Twelve have
reached a solid substratum of agreement, aided by common
presentation of views whenever possible. The EPC at the U.N.
has sometimes acted as a model for further European co-
operation. Progress in political co-operation in New York
will remain, nonetheless, highly dependant on a further de-
velopment of the European Community into a European Union.
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appendices a - c
APPENDIX A
Votes of the Twelve in the 40 t.h Genersl
APPENDIX B
Divided Votes of the Twelve ln the 40 th r.enera l
Abbreviations used as follows: Buropean Community = EC; Belgiua = B; Denaark : DB; Federal Republic
of Germany : FSG; Prance : F; Irland = ,IRL; Luxemburg : LUX;
Netherlands : NL; United Kingdom = UK; Portugal : P; Spain : S;
Common Vote : CV; Divided Vote : DV; Resolution : RBS.
Coamon Declaration : CD; Common Declaration on Resolution : DR;
Explanation of Common Votes : ECV
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APPENDIX A
VOTES OF THE TWELVE IN THE 4 0TH GENERAL ASSEMRT.V
Table of Votes by the Twelve on the resolut ions. amendment
«
—
d important paragraphs cast in the 40th G.A. Plenary
RBS DATE
1986 CONTENTS
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO A MAIN COMMITTEE
VOTE IN VOTE 0 D F G F I I L N U P St
PLENARY B R R U L K
Yes No Ab BC G L X
40/2 10/16
40/5 10/25
1/11
40/6 1/11
40/7 5/11
40/11 11/11
40/12 11/13
40/19 11/21
Credentials of representatives to the 40th GA Consensus
Motion of not taking action to aaendnent
A/40/L.3 (Israeli credentials) 80 41 20 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Co-operation between the U.N. aand the League of
Arab States
Aaendnent A/40/L.10, L.9 (Iranian proposal)
Israeli aggression against Iraqi nuclear
installations
Situation in Ranpuchea
Right of peoples to peace
Situation in Afghanistan
Return of cultural property to the countries
of their origin
133 2 2 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
79 2 50 CV A A A A A A A A A A A A
88 13 39 DV N N N A A A A N N N A A
114 21 16 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 7 Y Y
109 0 29 CV A A A A A A A A A A A A
122 19 12 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
123 0 15 DV A A A Y A A A A A A A A
40/21 11/27 Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) 107 4 41 DV A A A Y Y A Y A A N A Y
1st British aaendnent 38 60 43 DC Y Y Y A A Y A Y A Y Y N
2nd British aaendnent 36 57 47 DV Y Y Y A A Y A Y A Y Y N
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TZZ— No Ab EC g
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO A MAIN COMMITTEE
40/56 12/2 25th anniversary of the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 139 0 13 DV A Y A Y
40/57 12/2 Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 141 3 7 DV A Y A Y
40/58 12/2 Dissemination of information on decolonization 142 3 6 DV A Y A Y
40/62 12/9 Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte 117 1 22 DV A A A A
40/63 12/10 Law of the Sea
140 2 5 DV Y Y A Y
40/64 Policies of apartheid of the Government
of South Africa:
40/64A 12/10 Comprehensive sanctions against the racist regime
South Africa
122 18 14 DV N N N A
40/64B 12/10 Situation in South Africa and assistance to the
liberation movements
128 8 18 DV N A N Y
40/64C 12/10 World Conference on Sanctions 137 6 10 DV N Y N Y
40/64D 12/10 Public information and action against apartheid 150 i0 5 DV Y Y Y Y
40/64B 12/10 Relations between Israel and South Africa 102 20 30 DV N. N N A
40/64F 12/10 Programme of work of Special Committee against
Apartheid
141 ;1 12 DV A Y A Y
40/64G 10/12 International Convention against Apartheid
in Sports 125 () 24 CV A A A A
40/641 10/12 Concerted international action for the
elimination of apartheid 149 2 4 DV Y Y A ?
40/96A 12/12 Question of Palestine 128 2 22 DV A A A Y
A 7
A Y
A Y
N A
Y Y
N N
N A
A Y
Y Y
N N
A Y
A A
Y Y
A A
A
A
A
v
N
Y
N
A
A
Y
A
A A A A Y
A Y N Y Y
A A N Y Y
A A A A A
Y Y A Y Y
N N N N fi
N A N N A
A A N N A
Y 7 A Y Y
N 1 N A A
A A N A A
A A A A A
Y Y N Y Y
A A A A Y
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RES DATE
1986 CONTENTS
40/96B 12/12
40/96C 12/12
40/96D 12/12
40/97
40/97A 12/13
40/97B 12/13
40/97C 12/13
40/97D 12/13
Question of Palestine
Question of Palestine
Question of Palestine
Paragraph 4 of preamble
Paragraph 8 of preamble
Paragraph 2
Paragraph 5
Ouestion of Namibia:
Situation in Namibia resulting from the illegal
occupation of the territory by South Africa
separate vote on the words "United States" in
paragraph 24
separate vote on the words "the United States"
in paragraph 25
separate vote on the words "in particular US and
Israel" in paragraph 37
129 3 20 DV
131 3 18 DV
107 3 41 CV
84 22 38 DV
79 33 32 DV
111 6 29 DV
89 22 33 DV
131 0 23 CV
63 55 30 CV
59 58 29 CV
58 57 29 CV
A A A
A A A
A A A
N N N
N N N
A A A
N N N
Y A
Y A
A A
A N
A N
Y A
A N
A A A A
A A A A
A A A A
N N N N
N N N N
A A A A
N N N N
A A Y
A A Y
A A A
N N A
N N N
A A Y
N N A
separate vote on the words "Israel" in paragraph 46 79 47 25 CV
A A A
N N N
N N N
N N N
N N N
A A
N N
N N
N N
N N
A A A A A A A
N N N N N N N
N N N N N N K
N N | N
N N N N
N N N
N N N
3 5 CV AAA. AAA A AAA A AImplementation of Security Council Resolution 435 130 0 2
separate vote on the words "US and" in 6th
line of preamble 64 55 29 CV N N N N N
separate vote on paragraph 11 59 40 47 CV N N N N N
separate vote on the words "and the government of
the United States" in paragraph 12 54 63 29 CV N N N N N
separate vote on paragraph 15 81 30 34 CV N N N N N
Programme of work of the U.N. Council for Namibia 147 0 6 DV Y Y A Y A
Information and mobilization of public opinion 132 0 23 CV A A A A A
N N N N
N N N N
N N N N
N N N N
Y Y Y Y
A A A A
N N N
N N N
N N N
N N N
A Y Y
A A A
40/97E 12/13 U.N. Fund for Namibia 148 0 6 DV Y Y A Y A Y Y Y Y A Y Y
128
~
Yes Ho Ab RC
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO A MAIN COMMITTEE
40/97F 12/13 Special session of the G.A. on the question of
Namibia
40/168A 12/16 The situation in the Middle East
Paragraph 10
40/168B 12/16 The situation in the Middle East
40/168C 12/16 The situation in the Middle East
148 0 6 DV Y Y A Y A Y 7 Y Y A Y 7
98 19 31 DV N N N Y N N N N N N N A
64 33 41 !-V N N N N N N N N N N N
86 23 37DVNNNYNNNNNNNA
137 2 10 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y y
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORTS OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE
40/18 11/18
40/79 12/12
40/80A 12/12
40/80B 12/12
40/81 12/12
40/33 12/12
40/84 12/12
40/85 12/12
Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations
Implementation of resolution 39/51 (Treaty of
Tlatelolco)
Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear
weapons
Idem
Urgent need for a comprehensive nuciear-test-ban
treaty
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 5
Establishment of a'nuciear-weapon-free zone in
South Asia
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Convention on the security of non-nuclear-weapon
states
™ 0 12 W A Y A Y Y A A A A Y
139 0 7 DV Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
124 3 21 DV A A A Y N Y A A A N A A
1-1 3 24 DV A A A Y N A A A A N A A
116 4 29 DV A Y A Y N Y A A Y N A V
84 4- 55 DV A Y A Y N Y A A Y N a Y
94 12 35 DV Y Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y
104 3 41 DV Y A Y Y A Y A Y Y A Y Y
Consensus
101 19 25 DV N N NANA N N N N N N
129
Yes No Ab EC fl
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORTS OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE
40/86 12/12
40/87 12/12
40/88 12/12
40/89A 12/12
40/89B 12/12
40/90 12/12
40/91B 12/12
40/92A 12/12
40/92C 12/12
40/93 12/12
40/34
40/94A 12/12
40/94F 12/12
International arrangements against the use or threat
of use of nuclear weapons
Prevention of an arms race in outer space
Paragraph 5
Paragraph 9
Implementation of resolution 39/60
Declaration of the Denuclearization of Africa
Nuclear capability of South Africa
Prohibition of new typs of weapons of mass
destruction
Reduction of military budgets
Chemical and bacteriological weapons
Idem
Israeli nuclear armament
Paragraph 4
Paragraph 5
General and couple te disarmament:
Conventional desarmament on a regional scale
Study on the naval arms race
142 0 6 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y y y y
151 0 2CVYYYYYYYYYYYY
123 2 21 DV A A A Y A Y A A A A A A
136 2 11 DV A Y A Y A Y A A A A A Y
120 3 29 DV A A A Y N A A A A N A A
148 0 6 DV A Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y A 7 Y
135 4 14 DV A Y A Y N Y A A A N A Y
128 1 21 CV A A 'A A A A A A A A A A
113 13 15 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
93 15 41 DV N A N A N A N N N N n N
112 16 22 CV
_
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
101 2 4" DV A A A Y A A A A A A A A
91 24 28 DV N N N Y N N N N N N N tj
39 22 32 DV N N N A N N N N N N N N
123 0 8 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
146 1 3CVYYYYYYYYYYYY
40/9tu 12/12 Prohibition of fissionable material for weapons 145 1 7 DV Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y A Y Y
40/94H 12/12 Nuclear-weapon freeze 120 19 59 DV N N N
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VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THB REPORTS OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE
40/941 12/12
40/94E 12/12
40/94L 12/12
40/94M 12/12
40/94N 12/12
40/150 12/16
40/151
40/ 15 1A 12/16
40/15 IB 12/16
40/151C 12/16
40/151D 12/16
40/151E 12/16
40/151F 12/16
71
107
19 59
13 16
Limitation and reduction of naval armaments
(confidence-building measures)
Objective information on military matters
Compliance with arms limitation and
disarmament agreements
Third Review Conference to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Disarmament and the maintenance of international
peace and security
Bconomic and social consequences of the
armaments race
Review and implementation of the 12th Special
Session of the General Assembly:
Disarmament and international security
World Disarmament Campaign
Nuclear-arms freeze
World Disarmement Campaign (actions and activities) 114 0 34
Freeze on nuclear weapons 125 12 10
DV N
CV V
N N A
Y Y Y
N A N
Y Y Y
N N N
Y Y Y
N N
Y Y
131 0 16 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
138 0 11 DV Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y Y A
99 0 53 DV Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y Y ! I
139 1 7 DV A Y A Y A Y Y A A A Y Y
123 1 23 DV A A A Y
139 0 11 DV A Y A Y
131 10 3 DV N Y A Y
CV A A A A
DV N Y N Y
A A
v v
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of
Nuclear Weapons 126 17 6 DV N N N A
A A a
A Y A
A Y fl
AAA
N Y N N N N N A
NAN N N N !,
A A A
A A A
A A N
A A A
40/151H 12/16 U.N. programme of fellowships on disarmament 148 1 1 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y v y v y
131
1986
lea WO AD
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORTS OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE
Seriew of the implementation of the recomandations
of the 10th special session of the Q.A.:
40/152A 12/16 Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of
nUclear war
123 19 7 DV
40/1528 12/16 Bilateral nuclear-arms and space-arms negotiations 107
40/152C 12/16 Nuclear-weapons in all aspects
40/152B 12/16 Disarmament Week
40/ 1 52u 12/16 Climatic effects of nuclear war
40/152H 12/16 Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon
40/1521 12/16 International co-operation for disarmament
40/152J 12/16 Recommendations of the 10th special session
40/152M 12/16 Report of the Conference on Disarmament
N N y N ? N N N N N N
cvyyyyyyyyyyyy
117 19 11 DV N N N Y N A N Y N N N N
1-9 0 22 CV A A A A A A A A A A A A
141 1 10 DV A Y A Y A Y A A A A Y Y
7 0 11 65 DV N A N A N A N A A N N A
109 19 17 DV N N N A N A N N N N N N
128 0 20 DV A Y A Y Y Y A A A A Y v
133 2 18 DV A A A Y N Y A A A A A A
40/152N 12/16 Recommendations of the 10th special session 135 13 5 DV N Y N Y N Y A N N N N A
131 16 6 DV N A N Y N Y N N N N N A
40/152P 12/16 Cessation of the nuclear-arras race and nuclear
disarmament
40/152Q 12/16 Prevention of nuclear war 136 3 14 DV A A A Y N Y A A A N A A
40/155A 12/15 Question of Antarctica 96 0 11 CV A A A
40/156B 12/16 Idem 92 0 14 CV A A A
40/156C 12/16 Idem 100 0 12 CV A A A
40/158 12/16 Implementation of the Declaration on the
Strengthening of International Security 127 0 26 CV A A A A A A A A A A A A
40/159 12/16 Implementation of the collective security provisions
of the D.N. Charter 114 21 16 DV N A N Y N A N N N N N A
132
VOTES CAST Of) EISOUITIONS ON THE DEPORTS OP THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMTTEE
Report of the Special Comittee to Investigate
Israeli Practices Affecting the Homan Sights of the
Population of the Occupied Territories:
VOTE IN VOTE B D P G F I I L N U P 3
PLENARY g r r
Yes No Ab EC G
40/161A 12/16 Idem
40/161B 12/16 Idem
Paragrapn 1
40/161C 12/16 Idem
40/161D 12/16 Idem
Paragraph 6
Paragraph 21
40/161E 12/16 Idem
Paragraph 1
40/161F 12/16 Idem
40/161C 12/16 Idem
Paragraph 2
40/164A 12/16 Questions relating to information
40/164B 12/16 Idem
4L/lt'5 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA j:
40/165A 12/16 Assistance to Palestine refugees
40/165D 12/16 Offers of grants and scholarships
40/165E 12/16 Palestine refugees in the Gaza strip
40/155F 12/16 Resumption of the distribution to Palestine
refugees
95 2 37 CVAAAAAAAAAAAA
137 1 6 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 7 Y 7
139 1 4.CVYYYYYYYYYYYY
138 1 6 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y y
109 2 34 DV A A A Y A A A A A A A V
85 19 37 DV N N N A N N N N N N A A
136 1 7 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y v
126 1 19 DV A A A Y Y Y Y A A A Y Y
110 2 33 DV A A A Y A A A A A A Y Y
136 1 10 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 7 7 7
112 2 32 DV A A A Y A A A A A A A Y
96 2 45 CV A A A A A A A A A A A A
121 19 8 DV N N N A N A N N N N N A
122 16 9 DV N N N A A A A N N N N A
149 0 1 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
147 0 1 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 7
146 2 2 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
127 20 4 DV N N N Y N N N N N a n a
133
1986
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORTS OF THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE
40/165G 12/16
40/165H 12/16
40/1651 12/16
VOTE IN VOTE B D F G F I I L N U P 3
PLENARY E R 3 U L K
Yes No Ab EC G LX
Population and refugees displaced since 1967 127 2 23 DV A A A Y A 7TTT77T
Revenues derived from Palestine refugee properties 122 2 26 DV A A A Y A A A A A A Y y
40/165J 12/16
40/165K 12/16
40/167 12/16
Protection of Palestine refugees
7th line of preamble
Palestine refugees in the West Bank
University of Jerusalem for Palestine refugees
Israel’s decision to build a canal linking the
Mediterranean Sea to the Dead Sea
116 2 33 CV A A A A A A A A A A A A
101 16 29 DV N N N A N N N N N N A A
146 2 2 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
149 2 1 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
150 1 0 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORT OF
40/169 12/17
40/170 12/17
40/173 12/17
40/182 12/17
40/183 12/17
Economic development projects in the occupied
Palestinian territories jgg 2 7 CV Y Y Y Y Y
Assistance to the Palestinian people H 5 2 1 CV Y Y Y Y Y
International economic security gg 19 28 DV fi N N a N
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 134 1 19 CV A A A A A
Y y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N N N N ii H N
A A A A A A A
Specific action related to the particular needs and
problems of land-locked developing countries 152 0 1 CV Y Y Y Y Y
ParagraPh 1 116 1 29 DV A A A A Y Y Y A
Y Y Y
40/185 12/17
40/188 12/17
40/191 12/17
Economic measures as a means of political and
economic coercion against developing countries
Trade embargo against Nicaragua
Reverse transfer of technology
128 19 7 DV N N N A N N N N
91 6 49 DV A Y A Y Y A A A
151 1 0 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Y Y Y Y
Y A i Y
N N !i A
A A A Y
Y Y Y Y
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40/197 12/17
40/200 12/17
40/201 12/17
40/207 12/17
Remnants of war
International co-operation in the field of the
evnironment
Paragraph 7 of preamble
132 0 23 CV A A A A A A A A A A A A
149 0 6DVYYAYAYY7YAA7
123 8 17DVNYNYNYAA7NNA
Living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
occupied Palestinian territories 153 3
Long-term trends in economic development
1CVYYYYYYYYYYYY
!41 1 12 DV A A A Y A Y A A Y A A. A
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORTS OF THE THIRD COMMITTEE
40/23 11/29
40/25 11/29
40/27 11/29
National experience in achieving far-reaching
social and economic changes for the purpose of
social progress
Importance of the universal realization of the right
of peoples to self-determination ana of the granting
of independence for effective guarantee and
observance of human rights
Paragraph 26
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid
3rd line of preamble
5th paragraph
3th paragraph
133 1 11 DV A Y A Y Y Y A A A A Y Y
113 17 9 DV N N N A N A N N N N A A
94 3 39 CV A A A A A A A A
, A A
120 1 24 CV A A A A A A A A A A A A
114 9 16 DV N A N A N A N N N N N A
118 11 14 DV N A N A N N N N N N N A
119 11 12 DV N A N A N N N N N N N A
40/28 11/29 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination
4th paragraph
5th paragraph
13th paragraph
136 1 9 DV A Y A Y A Y A A A A A Y
93 9 32 DV N A N A N A N N N N N A
122 122CVAAAAAAAAAAAA
122 0 23 CV A A A A A A A A A A A A
40/100 12/13 World social situation 127 1 24 CV A A A A A A A A A A A A
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40/111 12/13 Human rights and use of scientific and
technological developments
127 9 16 DV N A N Y N A N A N N N A
40/112 12/13 Human rights and scientific and technological
toel0P"tS
0 22DVAAA1AAAAAAAA
12/13 Indivisibility and interdependence of econonic,
social, cultural, civil and political rights 131 1 IS DV A A A I A Y A A ? A A I8th line of preamble m 7 ... . . „ ‘
lnHl . L1
125 7 20 DV A A N A N A N A A N A A10th .ine of proarafalo ion i ^ *«r .130 1 23 CV A A A A A A A A A A A A
11th line of preamble nn » 17 n„ , ,
‘ A
130 7 17 DV A A N A N A N A N N A A
40/124 12/13 Alternative approaches for improving the effective
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms 130 1 22 CV A A A A A A A A A A A *
40/137 12/13 Question of human rights and fundamental freedoms
in Afghanistan on „ r80 22 40 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y 7 Y Y Y y v
40/b3 12/13 Situation of human rights and fundamental freedom
in El Salvador
2 42 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y y y Y Y
40/140 12/13 Situation of human rights and fundamental freedom
in Guatemala
91 8 47 CVYYYYYYY Y Y y Y Y
40/141 12/13 Situation of human rights in Iran
40/145 12/13 Situation of human rights and funaamental freedom
in Chile
53 30 45 CV Y Y Y Y 7 y Y Y Y Y Y Y
88 11 47 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y y Y Y Y Y
40/148 12/13 Measures to be taken against Nazi, Fascist and
neo-Fascist activities all other forms of total-
itarian ideologies
7th line of preamble
121 2 27 CV A A A A A A A A A A A A
106 19 13 CV N N N N N M N M N N N N
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40/50 12/2
40/51 12/2
40/52 12/2
40/53 12/2
Question of Western Sahara qc 7 „ „36 7 33 M A A A Y A A A A A A A V
Inforaation from Non-Self-Governing Territories 149 0 3 DV Y Y Y Y A Y Y Y Y A Y
'<•
Activities of foreign economic and other interests 125 9 16 DV N A N A N A N N N N N A
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by
the specialized U.N. agencies i 2 g 3 ?? nv . . . , , ,140 J U DV A A A Y A A A A A N A A
40/59A 12/2
40/59B 12/2
40/239A 12/18
40/241B 12/18
40/243 12/18
40/246A 12/18
40/246B 12/18
40/247 12/18
40/248 12/18
40/252 12/18
Idea
Final budget appropriations for the bienniua
1984-1985
Financial emergency of the United Nations
Pattern of conferences
Pattern of conferences - section I
93 10 8 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y v y y y
125 12 10 DV A Y N Y A Y A A A :i A a
132 12 2 CV Y y Y y y y y y y y 7 7
Consensus
131 1 17 DV A A A Y A Y A A A A A 7
Financing of the U.N. Interim forces in Lebanon 124 15 4 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y ? Y y y y
Idem
Review of the rates of reimbursement to the
governments of troop-contributing states
Scale of assesments for the apportionment of the
expenses of the U.N.
Questions to the proposed programme budget for
the biennium 1986-1387
Section IV
122 1 4 7 CV Y Y y y y y y y y y y y
120 14 7 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y y y y y y
15 27 DV A A A A A A A A A A A N
Consensus
135 2 11 Y Y Y Y A Y A Y Y N Y Y
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40/253
40/253A 12/18
40/253B 12/18
40/253C 12/18
40/254 12/18
40/255 12/18
Budget appropriations for 1986-8?
Income estimates for 1986-87
Financing of appropriations for 1986
12M0 11 DV A Y A Y A Y A A A A A A
137 10 0 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
126 11 13 DV A Y A Y A Y A A A A A A
Unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for
1986-87
139 8 0 CV Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 7 Y Y Y
Working Capital Fund for 1986-87 124 11 13 DV A Y A A A A A A A A A N
40/257 12/18 Bmoluments, pension scheme and conditions of
service for the members of the International
Court of Justices
121 11 15 DV N Y N Y N Y A N A N N A
VOTES CAST ON RESOLUTIONS ON THE REPORTS OF THE SIXTH COMMITTEE
'
40/67 12/11 Development of the principles and norms of inter-
national law relating to the new international
economic order
125 0 19 DV A A A Y A Y A A Y A A A
40/69 12/11 Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of
Mankind
127 6 9 dvaynynyaaanaa
40/70 12/11 Report on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the
Principle of Non-Use of Force in International
Relations
119 14 12 DV N N A Y N A N N N N N A
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appendix b
DI\ IDED VOTE S OF THE TWET.VT? IN__THE 4 OTH r,FNT7P^y, ASSEMBLY
g^-Ul£
f
a^aX^EUW°^^ on„nccH
votes cast, m the 4flt h G . A . P].^
"
ISOLATED MINORITY (15x1)
~
abbOLUTION
OBJBCT
ON THE
REPORT OF
MINORITY
40/19 Return of cultural porperty to the countries
of their origin
Plenary Greece
40/62 Question of the Comoran Island of Mayotte Plenary France
40/64A Comprehensive Sanctions against South Africa Plenary Greece
40/64D Public information and action against Apartheid Plenary United Kingdom
40/96D
Par. 8 preamble Question of Palestine Plenary Greece
40/79 Implementation of resolution 39/51
(Treaty of Tiatelcoco) 1st Com. France
40/81
Par. 5 Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear
test ban 1st Com. Prance
40/93 Israeli nuclear armament 1st Com. Greece
40/93
Par. 4 Israeli nuclear armament 1st Com. Greece
40/93
Par. 5 Israeli nuclear armament 1st Com. Greece
40/94N Disarmament and the maintenance of
international peace and security 1st Com. France
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RESOLUTION
OBJECT
ON THE
PVDADT A I?
MINORITY
40/151
A
Disarmament and international security
ttcrUHi Ur
1st Coa. Greece
40/173 International economic security
2nd Coo. Greece
40/112 Hunan rights and scientific and technological
developments
3rd Coa. Greece
40/248 Scalle of assesments for the apportionment
of the expenses of the U.N. 5th Coa. Spain
MINORITY OF TWO (2h2)
40/63 Law of the Sea
Plenary F.R. of Germany
United Kingdom
40/96A Question of Palestine
Plenary Greece
40/96B Question of Palestine
Plenary
Spain
Greece
40/95C Question of Palestine
Plenary
Spain
Greece
40/96D
Par. 4 preamble
Question of Palestine
Plenary
Spain
Greece
Spain
40/96D
Par. 2
Question of Palestine Plenary Greece
Spain
40/96D
Par. 5
Question of Palestine Plenary Greece
Spain
40/81
Par. 4
Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test
treaty
1st Com. United Kingdom
France
40/85 Convention on the security of non-nuclear-
states
1st Com. Ireland
Greece
40/87
Par. 5
Prevention of an arms race in outer space 1st Coa. Greece
Ireland
40/941 Limitation and reduction of naval armaments 1st Com. Greece
Ireland
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RESOLUTION
OBJECT
ON THE
REPORT OF
MINORITY
4U/34H Nuclear-weapon freeze
1st Coa. Greece
Ireland
40/94M Third Review Conference to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
1st Coa. France
Spain
40/151F Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of
Nuclear Weapons
1st Coa. Greece
Ireland
40/152A Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of
nuclear war
1st Coa. Greece
Ireland
40/152T International co-operation for disarmament 1st Coa. Greece
Ireland
40/ 1 6 ID Israeli practices in the occupied
territories
SPC Greece
Spain
40/161G Israeli practices in the occupied
territories
SPC Greece
Spain
40/185 Bconoaic measures as a means of political and
econoaic coercion against developing countries
2nd Com, Greece
Spain
40/50 Question of the Western Sahara 4th Com. Greece
Spain
40/51 Information froa Non-Self-Governing Territories 4th Com. France
United Kingdom
40/255 Working Capital Fund for 1986-87 5th Com. Denmark
Spain
MINORITY OF THREE (19x3)
40/648 Relations between Israel and South Africa Plenary Greece
Portugal
40/97C Programme of work of the U.N. Council for
Namibia
Plenary
Spain
F.R. of Germany
France
United Kingdca
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RESOLUTION
OBJECT
OR THB MINORITY
REPORT OF40/97E
40/97P
40/89A
40/92A
40/ 1 6 ID
Par. 5
40/1 6 IB
Par, 1
40/165G
40/165H
40/1651
Par. 7 preamble
40/207
40/27
Par, 5
U.N. Fund for Namibia
Plenary
Special session of the G.A. on the ,oestion Plenar,
of Namibia
Declaration of the Denuclearization of Africa 1st Com,
Chemical and bacteriological weapons 1st Com.
Israeli practices in the occupied territories SPC
Israeli practices in the occupied territories SPC
Population and refugees displaced since 1967 SPC
Protection of Palestine refugees SPC
Protection of Palestine refugees SPC
Long-term trends in economic development 1st Com.
Convention on the Supression and Punishment of 3rd Com.
the Crime of Apartheid
F.R. of Germany
France
United Kingdom
F.R, of Germany
France
United Kingdom
Belgium
Prance
United Kingdom
Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Greece
Portugal
Spain
Greece
Portugal
Spain
Greece
Portugal
Spain
Greece
Portugal
Spain
Greece
Portugal
Spain
Greece
Ireland
Netherlands
Denmark
Greece
Spain
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RESOLUTION
l(\ I 1) 7
OBJECT
ON THB
REPORT OF
MINORITY
—
win
Par. 8
Idea
3rd Coa. Denmark
Greece
Spain
40/243 Pattern of conferences - section I 5th Coa. Greece
Ireland
Spain
40/25 3A Budget appropriations for 1986-87 5th Coa. Denraark
Greece
Ireland
40/253C Financing of appropriations for 1986 5th Coa. Denmark
Greece
Ireland
40/67 Development of tbe principles and norms of
international law relating to the new inter-
national econoaic order
5th Coa. Greece
Ireland
Netherlands
MINORITY OF FOUR (13x4)
40/56 25th anniversary of the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
Plenary Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Spain
40/18 Bilateral nuclear-aras negotiations 1st Com, Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Spain
40/83 Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone
in South Asia
1st Cos. Denmark
France
Italy
United Kingdom
40/87
Par. 9
Prevention of an arras race in outer space 1st Cora.
.
Denmark
Ireland
Spain
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RESOLUTION
OBJECT
OR THE MINORITY
REPOST OF40/188 Trade Bmbargo against Nicaragua
2nd Com.
40/200 International co-operation in the field of 2nd Con.
the environnent
40/25 Universal realization of the right to self
determination
3rd Com.
40/27
Par. 3 preamble
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment
of the Crime of Apartheid
3rd Com.
Denmark
Greece
France
Spain
F.R. of Germany
France
United Kingdom
Portugal
Greece
Ireland
Portugal
Spain
Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Spam
40/23 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of 3rd Com. Denmark
Racial Discrimination
„Greece
Ireland
Spain
^/28 Idem
Par. 4
3rd Com. Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Spain
Indivisibility and interdependence of economic 3rd Com. Greece
social, cultural, civil and political rights Ireland
Netherlands
Spain
40/114 Idem
Par. 8 preamble
3rd Com. F.R. of Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
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RESOLUTION
i n /r o
OBJBCT
ON THE
RBPORT OF
MINORITY
4 U / D Z Activities of foreign economic and other
interests
4th Com. Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Spain
MINORITY OF FIVg (5x5)
lU/IDIb World Disarmament Campaign
1st Com. Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Portugal
Spain
40/152G climatic effects of nuclear war 1st Com. Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Portugal
Spain
40/164B Questions relating to information SPC Greece
France
Ireland
Italy
Spain
40/183
Par, 1
Specific action re 1 ted to the particular
needss and problems of land-locked developing
countries
2nd Com. France
Ireland
Italy
Portugal
Spain
40/114
Par, il preamble
Indivisibility and interdependence of economic
social, cultural, civil and political rights
3rd Com. F.R. of Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
United Kingdom
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RESOLUTION
40/21
40/57
40/58
OBJECT
ON THE
REPORT OF
MINORITY
THREE-WAY SPLIT VOTE
Question of the Falkland Islands Plenary
The two British amendments
Plenary
Implementation of the Declaration on the Plenary
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and people
Dissenination of information on decolonization Plenary
N: United Kingdom
Y: Greece
France
Italy
Spain
A: the others
N: Spain
A: Greece
France
Italy
Netherlands
Y: the others
N: United Kingdom
A: Belgium
F.R. of Germany
France
Italy
Luxemburg
Y: the others
N: United Kingdom
A: Belgium
F.R, of Germany
France
40/84B
40/64C
Situation in South Africa and assistance to
the liberation movements
Plenary
World Conference on Sanctions
Luxemburg
Y: the others
Y: Greece
A: Denmark
Ireland
Netherlands
Spain
N: the others
Plenary Y: Denmark
Greece
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RESOLUTION
OBJBCT
ON TRB MINORITY
REPOST OF
40/64P
40/641
40/168A
40/168B
40/80A
40/80B
40/31
Programme of work of Special Coaaittee
against Apartheid
Concerted international action for the
elifflination of apartheid
The situation in the Middle East
The situation in the Middle East
Ireland
A: France
Luxenburg
Netherlands
Spain
N.' the others
Plenary N: United Kingdom
Y: Denmark
Greece
Ireland
A: the others
Plenary N: United Kingdom
A: F , S
. of Germany
Y: the others
Plenary Y: Greece
A: Spain
N: the others
Plenary Y: Greece
A: Spain
N: the others
Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear 1st Com.
weapons
Y: Greece
Ireland
N: France
United Kingdom
A: the others
Cessation of ail test explosions of nuclear 1st Com. Y: Greece
weapons
• N: France
United Kingdom
A: the others
Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test- 1st Com,
ban treaty
Y: Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Netherlands
Spain
N: France
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RESOLUTION
OBJECT
40/88
40/89B
40/94G
40/151C
40/151E
40/152C
40/152M
Iapleaentation of resolution 39/60
Nuclear capability of South Africa
Prohibition of fissionable naterial for
weapons
Nuclear-arms freeze
Freeze on nuclear weapons
Nuclear-weapons in all aspects
Report of the Conference on Disarmament
ON THE MINORITY
REPORT OF
United Kingdom
A: the others
1st Com. Y; Greece
N: France
United Kingdom
A! the others
1st Com. Y: Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Spain
N: France
United Kingdom
A; the others
1st Com. N; France
A: United Kingdom
Y: the others
1st Com. Y: Denmark
Greece
Ireland
A: F.R. of Germany
Luxemburg
Netherlands
Spain
N: the others
1st Com. Y: Denmark
Greece
Ireland
A: Spain
N: the others
1st Com. Y; Greece
Luxemburg
A: Ireland
N: the others
1st Com. Y: Greece
Ireland
148
RESOLUTION
40/152N
40/152P
40/152Q
40/159
4 0/ 1 6 5 F
OBJECT
ON THE MINORITY
REPORT OF
Becoaaendations of the 10th special session 1st Con.
Cessation of the nuclear-aras race and nuclear 1st Com.
disarnaoent
Prevention of nuclear war 1st Con.
iiipieaentation of the collective security
provisions of the U. N. Charter
1st Coa,
Resumption of the distribution to Palestine SPC
refugees (UNRWA)
N: France
A: the others
Y: Denaark
Greece
Ireland
A: Italy
Spain
N: the others
Y: Greece
Ireland
A: Denaark
Spain
N: the others
Y: Greece
Ireland
N: France
United Kingdom
A: the others
Y: Greece
A: Denaark
Ireland
Spain
N: the others
Y: Greece
A: Spain
N: the others
40/200
Par. 7 preaable
International co-operation in the field of
the environaent
2nd Cob. Y: Denmark
Greece
Ireland
Netherlands
A: Italy
Luxemburg
Spain
N: the others
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RESOLUTION
OBJECT
ON TBB MINORITY
8EP0RT OF40/111
40/53
40/239A
40/252
40/255
40/257 ABC
40/69
Hunan rights and use of scientific and
technological developments
3rd Con. Y: Greece
A: Denmark
Ireland
Luxemburg
Spain
N: the others
Implementation of the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and peoples by the specialized U.N. agencies
Yl Greece
N.' United Kingdom
A: the others
Final budget appropriations for 1984-85 5th Com. N: United Kingdom
Y: Denmark
Greece
Ireland
A: the others
Questions to the proposed programme budget for 5th Com
1986-87
N: United Kingdom
A: France
Italy
Y: the others
Working Capital Fund for 1986-87 5th Com, Y: Denmark
N: Spain
A: the others
Emoluments, pension scheme and conditions of 5th Com.
service for the members of the International
Court of Justices
Y: Denmark
Greece
Ireland
A: Italy
Netherlands
Spain
Code of Offence against the Peace and Security 6th Com.
of Mankind
N: France
United Kingdom
Y: Denmark
Greece
Ireland
A: the others
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RESOLUTION
OBJECT
ON THE
REPORT OF
MINORITY
40/70 Report on Enhancing the Effectiveness of the
Principle of Non-Use of Force in International
Relations
6th Com. Y: Greece
A: F.R, of Germany
Ireland
Spain
N: the others
VOTBS DIAMETRICAL OPPOSED
(without three-way split votes)
40/93
Par. 4
Israeli nuclear araaaent 1st Coa. Y: Greece
N: the others
40/94H Nuclear-weapon freeze 1st Coa. Y: Greece
Ireland
N: the others
40/152A Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention
of nuclear war
1st Coa. Y: Greece
Ireland
N: the others
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appendix c
COMMON STATEMENTS RV THE TWKT.VE IN THE mth GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Common declarations (cd). common d^laration.
on resolutions (dr) and explication of common
—
Qtes
—
L
ecv) accolated by agenda items at the 40th G.A.
PLENARY MEETINGS (14 cd, 2 ecv, 6 dr)
STATEMENT A G B N D A ITEMS AND SUBJECT
24 September cd 9 General Debate
Jacques Poos, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Luxemburg on
behalf of the Buropean Community and its Member States.
23 October cd 39 Commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the U.N.
Jacques Santer, President of the government of Luxemburg,
on behalf of the European Community and its Member States.
25 October ecv 26 Co-operation between the U.N. and the League of Arab States.
28 October cd 35 Policies of apartheid of the government of South Africa.
4 November cd 22 The situation in Kampuchea.
1 November cd 29 Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear
installations.
7 November cd 30 Critical economic situation in Africa.
8 Noveaber cd 14 Report of the International Atomic Bnergy Agency.
11 November cd 28 The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for
international peace and security.
13 November cds 48 International Youth Year.
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"AI8 1J85 STATEMENT AGENDA ITEMS A N dTTTTTTT
21 November cd 25 Co-operation between the U.H. and the Organization of
African Unity,
22 November cd 21 The situation in Central America.
3 Deceaber cd 33 Question of Palestine.
5 Deceaber cd 38 The situation in the Kiddle Bast.
10 Deceaber dr 35 Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa.
12 Deceaber dr 33 Question of Palestine.
13 Deceaber dr 34 Question of Namibia.
16 December dr 38 The situation in the Middle East.
17 Deceaber ecv 84 Development and international economic co-operation.
17 Deceaber dr 84c Idea
17 December dr 84c Idea
FIRST COMMITTEE (7 cd, 1 ecv]
17 October cd General Debate.
1 November cd 69 Selationh ip between disarmament and development.
5 November cd 63 Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.
5 November cd 6 Id Consideration of guidelines for confidence building
measures
.
7 November cd 61b
68b, d ,
e
General and complete disarmament.
A November cd 62 Reduction of military budgets.
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DATE 1985 STATEMENT AGENDA I T B H S AND S U B J B C T
18 November ecv 60 Prohibition of the developaent and aanufactrue of new types
of weapons of aass destruction and new systems of such
weapons.
2 Deceaber cd 72 Eeview of the implementation of the Declaration on the
trengthening of International Security.
S P B C I A L P 0 L I T I C A L COMMITTBE (7 cd, 2 ecv]
4 October cd 74 Effects of atoaic radiation.
9 October cd 77 Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping
operations in all their aspects.
11 October cd 80 International co-operation to avert new flows of refugees.
30 October cd 75 Report of the Special Coaaittee to investigate Israeli
practices affecting the human rights of the population of
the occupied territories.
7 November cd 79 Committee for Palestinians refugee.
13 Noveaber cd 78 Questions relating to information
.
21 Noveaber cd 76 International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer
space.
15 Noveaber ecv 79 - United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA)
.
6 Deceaber ecv 78 Questions relating to information
L! E C 0 N D COMMITTEE (4 cd, 4 ecv)
9 October cd General Debate.
23 October cd 84 Developaent and international economic co-operation.
30 October cd 12 Report of the Bconomic and Social Council.
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DATB 1985 STATEMENT agenda items and subject
6 Novenber cd 84 Developaent and international econcaic co-operation,
(second part)
.
11 Noveaber ecv 12o Sconoaic projects of developaent in the occupied
Palestinian territories.
11 Noveaber ecv 12p Assistance to the Palestinian people.
11 Noveaber ecv 84g Condition of Palestinian people in the occupied territories.
25 Noveaber ecv 12a International econoaic security.
T H I R D COMMITTEE (4 cd, 3 ecv, 1 dr)
7 October cd 88 Iapleaentation of the Prograaae of Action for the Second
Decade to caabat racisa and racial discriaination.
28 October cd 92 World conference to review and appraise the achievements of
the U.N. Decade for woaen: equality, development and peace.
1 Noveaber ecv 34c Status of the International Convention on the Suppress: on
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.
4 Noveaber ecv 93 Importance of the universal realization of the right of
peoples to self-determination and of the granting of
independence to colonial countries and peoples for 1 .
guarantee and observance of human rights.
11 Noveaber cd 105 Report of the 'J.N. High Coaaissioner for Refugees.
19 Noveaber dr 94 Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discriaination.
26 Noveaber cd 12 Report of the Econoaic and Social Council.
27 Noveaber ecv 90 World social situation.
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MT! I98S Sf*™8” *»»»»* ITSKS AND S 777777
p 0 U B T H COMMITTBB (1 dr)
Activities which are impeding the lnpienentation of the
declaration on the granting of independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples in Namibia and in all other
territories under colonial doaination
.
FIFTH COMMITTEE (11 cd, 3 dr)
30 September cd 114 Financial reports and audited financial statements, and
reports of the Board of Auditors.
15 October dr 114 Idem
25 October cd 116 Proposed programme budget for 1985-1937.
117 Programme planning.
1 November cd 117 Programme planning.
26 Noveaber cd 118 Financial emergency of the U.N.
11 December cd 119 Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of the U.N. with
the specialized agencies and the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
25 Noveaber cd 120 Joint Inspection Unit.
17 October cd 121 Pattern of conferences.
1 Noveaber dr 121 Pattern of conferences.
9 October cd 122 Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses
of the U.N.
17 December dr 122 Idem, Report of the committee on contributions.
9 December cd 123 Personnel questions,
15 Noveaber cd 124 United Nations common system.
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DATE 1985 STATEMENT agenda I t b m s and subject
125 United Nations pension system,
cd 124 United Nations common system,
SIXTH C 0 M M I T i E E (5 cd, 3 ecv, 1 motion of procedure)
2 October cd 136 Protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular
missions and representatives.
16 October cd 137 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the drafting of an
international convention against the recruitment, use,
financing and training of mercenaries.
24 October cd 129 Measures to prevent international terorism and study of the
couses of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence.
22 November cd 130 Progressive development of the principles and norms of
international law relating to the new international
economic order.
27 November ecv 137
'
Report of the Ad Hoc Coamittee on the drafting of an
international convention against the recruitment, use,
financing and training of mercenaries,
27 November ecv 127 consideration of the draft articles on most favoured nation
clauses.
2 December cd 131 Development and strengthening of good-neight.uriiness
between states.
3 December ecv 131 Idem
2 Deceaber mp 141 Report of the Committee on the Charter of the U.N.
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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. DOCUMENTS
^Qinmiss 100 o f t-he European Communi ti^ ( ed
)
:ulletin of the European Communities (Brussels 1970-1986 )
Federal
—Repub lic of Germany;
Permanent Mission at the United Nations ( ed ) , Positions ofe ederal Republic of Germany on United NationsIssues at the 40th 7 iCXL -Lu b
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